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You seekfor knowledge and wisdom, as I once did; and I ardently hope
that the gratification ofyour wishes may not be a serpent to sting you, as
mine has been.1
INTRODUCTION
o began Victor Frankenstein's recounting of his life story to
Robert Walton. Haunted by the monster that he had created,
Frankenstein warned Walton of the dangers of blind fealty to
science. More than just a modem day horror story, Shelley's novel serves
as a warning of the dangers associated with an unrestrained search for
1 MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN 17 (J. Paul Hunter ed., 1996). The excerpted
language is taken from Shelley's 1818, not 1831, edition of Frankenstein.
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knowledge. Frankenstein's monster personifies the perils of scientific
tampering with the natural order.
The Frankenstein imagery lingers just below the surface of the current
debate on cloning. In early 1997, the first adult mammalian clone was born,
generating an enormous public outcry about the dangers of unrestrained
scientific inquiry.2 Subsequently named Dolly, her birth broke new
scientific ground. At the same time, it tapped into a societal uneasiness
about the proper limits of scientific inquiry. Scientific discoveries do not
unfold in a vacuum. They play out against a cultural backdrop in which
both fantasy and reality are intertwined. Tampering with the process of
creation, whether it be in the form of assisted reproductive technology,
genetic testing, or, at its most extreme, cloning, plays on "profound
concerns regarding the nature of humankind and its relationship to other
aspects of the natural world."3
It came as no surprise, then, that both Congress and numerous state
legislatures hastily drafted new legislation banning various forms of
cloning and withdrawing or restricting funds from certain types of
scientific projects involving cloning.4 Within three weeks of Dolly's birth,
the United States Senate held hearings addressing the challenges posed by
cloning technology.5 President Clinton also acted quickly. One day after
scientists announced Dolly's birth, President Clinton penned a letter to Dr.
Harold Shapiro, the Chair of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
("NBAC"), asking the Commission to report back to him after having
"undertake[n] a thorough review of the legal and ethical issues associated
with the use of this [cloning] technology."6 Upon receiving the NBAC's
report, President Clinton sent to Congress the Cloning Prohibition Act of
2 See GINAKOLATA, CLONE: THERoADTODOLLYANDTHEPATHAHEAD 34-35
(1998) ("The World Health Organization said it opposed the cloning of humans.
The Humane Society opposed the cloning of animals. The American Society of
Reproductive Medicine issued a press release saying it 'finds the practice of human
cloning... unacceptable."').
3NATIONALBIOETHICS ADVISORYCOMM'N, CLONINGHUMANBEINGS: REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION 6
(1997) [hereinafter CLONING HUMAN BEINGS] (footnote omitted).
4See infra notes 146-47, 205-07.
5See ExaminingScientific Discoveries in Cloning, Focusing on Challengesfor
Public Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Health and Safety of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter
Cloning Hearing].
6 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at Letter from the President.
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1997 ("CPA"),7 which bans the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer, the
technology used to create Dolly.8
Congress has not yet enacted legislation banning or regulating cloning.
Any anti-cloning legislation raises a number of important constitutional
issues. 9 This Article addresses two of those issues. First, does Congress
have the power pursuant to the Commerce Clause to ban or regulate
cloning? Second, even if the Commerce Clause does empower Congress to
prohibit all or some forms of cloning, is such a prohibition an unwarranted
government intrusion on a fundamental right, so as to violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
Part I of this Article begins with a description of the science of cloning
and concludes with a history of cloning research, both of which provide a
much needed perspective on the current national debate over cloning. Part
II summarizes the President's proposed cloning legislation, as well as the
bills introduced in Congress since February of 1997, when Dolly's birth
was announced. The quality of the drafting of these proposals suggests
caution, because poorly crafted legislation leads to unintended conse-
quences. Part M examines the federal response to cloning in the context of
Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Part IM concludes that
Congress may ban cloning pursuant to its power to regulate interstate
commerce, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's recent decision in United
States v. Lopez.' Finally, Part IV provides an analysis of the Supreme
Court's substantive due process cases involving the right of personal
privacy. The trends in the Court's case lw strongly suggest that a majority
of the current Court would hold that a federal government ban on cloning
would not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Although
the reasoning used by individual Justices may vary, it is likely that a
majority of the current Court would conclude that the right to use and have
access to cloning technology is not a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution.
7 CLONING PROHIBITION ACT OF 1997, H.R. Doc. No. 105-97 (1997).
'See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
9This Article addresses only some of the issues raised by the federal regulation
of cloning. For example, most of the federal anti-cloning bills do not address the
preemption issue. It is an open question whether states could regulate cloning in a
more restrictive fashion than federal law. Several states have adopted anti-cloning
legislation, and bills have been introduced in a number of state legislatures. See
infra notes 205-07.0United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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I. THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF GENETICS AND CLONING
The birth of Dolly made the term "cloning" a part of everyday
language, yet scientists have engaged in various forms of animal and
human cell cloning for several decades. Why did these earlier experiments
not generate the public outcry that followed Dolly's birth? The reason is
that Dolly's birth opened the door to the possibility of cloning an entire
human being from the somatic" cell of an adult human. In order to
understand the current public debate over cloning, it is important to
understand how genetic information is transmitted in normal human
reproduction, how cloning alters that process, and how scientific inquiry
and exploration brought society to the ethical crossroads it now faces.
A. Human Reproduction2
The cornerstone of human reproduction is deoxyribonucleic acid
("DNA"). DNA consists of two extremely long strands of nucleotides
coiled around each other in what is known as a "double helix."'13 A
nucleotide consists of three components: (1) one of four bases: adenine,
guanine, cytidine, or thymidine; (2) a sugar; and (3) a phosphate. Because
adenine pairs only with thymidine and guanine pairs only with cytidine, the
bases on one strand of the DNA attract the complementary bases on the
other strand, resulting in the double helix formation. The importance of
DNA lies in these bases along the strands of the double helix. They create
a code for different types of proteins, and these proteins, in turn, are
" There are two categories of cells in the human body: (1) somatic and (2) germ
line. All of the cells in the body, except for the human reproductive cells, i.e., ovum
and sperm cells, are somatic cells. Germ cells are the human reproductive cells. See
Dennis S. Karjala, A LegalResearch Agendafor the Human Genome Initiative, 32
JuRIMETIcs J. 121, 133 (1992).
12 The explanation in the text outlines the process of DNA and cell duplication
provided in an earlier paper. See Anne Lawton, Regulating Genetic Destiny: A
Comparative Study of Legal Constraints in Europe and the United States, 11
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 365,369-71 (1997). For a complete explanation of genetic
inheritance, see Robert P. Wagner, Understanding Inheritance, in THE HUMAN
GENOME PROJECT: DECIPHERING THE BLUEPRINT OF HEREDITY 2-67 (Necia Grant
Cooper ed., 1994) [hereinafter HUMAN GENOME PROJECT].
13 The double helix has been described as resembling "two-ply embroidery
floss, [which] is composed of two strands coiled helically about a common axis."
Wagner, supra note 12, at 38.
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responsible for the manifestation of different human traits or genetic
characteristics. 1
4
Each human cell contains DNA. Without DNA, cell duplication and
human growth could not occur. One cell becomes two through a process in
which DNA replicates itself.5 The process begins when the two strands of
the double helix separate or unwind. The bases on each individual strand
attract their complementary bases, for example, adenine pairs with
thymidine. Eventually, two double helices result, both copies of the original
double helix. The original cell then divides into two cells, each with its own
complement of double-stranded DNA.16
The double-stranded DNA in the body's cells is "subdivided into
specific stretches or regions called genes." 17 "A gene is essentially a section
of a DNA molecule that codes for (directs) the production of protein
products used by the organism to build up and repair its various parts,
catalyze metabolic processes, or even regulate the activity of other
genes."'" The genes, in turn, are arranged along rodlike structures called
chromosomes. 19 In the somatic cells, chromosomes are paired. In the
human body, each somatic cell contains forty-six, or twenty-three pairs, of
chromosomes. 0 Chromosomes are not paired in the germ cells, i.e., the
ovum and the sperm; thus, germ cells contain a total of only twenty-three
chromosomes. 2'
The sperm fertilizes the ovum during sexual reproduction, causing each
germ cell to contribute one set of twenty-three chromosomes. Fertilization
begins when the egg and sperm fuse, creating a one-celled organism,
known as the zygote. That one-celled organism, however, contains two
nucleiF-one from the sperm and one from the egg-labeled as pronuclei by
scientists.' However, the two nuclei do not fuse at the zygote stage.
'
4See Karjala, supra note 11, at 129, 136-37.
See Wagner, supra note 12, at 42-43 (discussing DNA replication).
16 See id.
17 KARLDRLICA,UNDERSTANDINGDNAAND GENE CLONING: A GUIDEFORTHE
CURIOUS 4 (1984).
11 Karjala, supra note 11, at 129.
19 See id. at 133.
20 See Wagner, supra note 12, at 12.
21 See Kaijala, supra note 11, at 133.
2 Nuclei is the plural of nucleus, "the cell structure that houses the chromo-
somes, and thus the genes." CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, app. at 3.
Typically, human cells contain only one nucleus.
I Scientists use the term "pronuclei" to refer to the sperm and egg nuclei
because each contains only 23 chromosomes, half the genetic complement of an
[VOL. 87
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What actually happens is that the chromosomes in the two pronuclei
duplicate themselves separately, and then copies from each come together
inside the actual nuclei formed after the first cell division. It is within
each of the two nuclei present in the two-cell embryo that a complete set
of forty-six human chromosomes commingle for the first time. Fertiliza-
tion is now complete.24
This two-celled organism is called an embryo or a pre-embryo.2 The
embryo contains two pairs of twenty-three chromosomes, one set from each
genetic parent, comprising the necessary forty-six chromosomes required
in somatic cells. Genetic diversity results from this pairing of chromosomes
from each parent. Any child born through sexual reproduction differs
genetically from both of the child's parents because the child's genetic
make-up is a combination of traits inherited from both parents.2 6
adult human.
24 LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: CLONING AND BEYOND IN A BRAVE NEW
WORLD 38 (1997).
1 The American Fertility Society uses the term "pre-embryo." See Ethics
Comm. ofthe Am. Fertility Soc'yEthical Considerations ofAssistedReproductive
Technologies, 62 FERTILITY & STERILITY 30S (Supp. 11994) [hereinafter Ethical
Considerations]. Others criticize the use of the term "pre-embryo."
The term pre-embryo has been embraced wholeheartedly by lVF [in vitro
fertilization] practitioners for reasons that are political, not scientific. The
new term is used to provide the illusion that there is something profoundly
different between what we nonmedical biologists still call a six-day-old
embryo and what we and everyone else call a sixteen-day-old embryo.
SILVER, supra note 24, at 39. George J. Annas, the Edward R. Utley Professor of
Public Health Law at Boston University School of Public Health, argues that the
AmericanFertility Society created the term "pre-embryo" to define out of existence
the problem of IVF practitioners manipulating embryos during IVF procedures.
[T]he AFS Ethics Committee opted to "solve" their members' problem by
redefinition. The Committee decided that extracorporeal human embryos
were not really embryos at all, but were "preembryos," an invented term for
what had previously been called preimplantation embryos.... All this
would seem unimportant wordplay, except that redefining the
preimplantation embryo as a nonembryo permitted the committee to advise
its members that anything goes with these now nonembryos ....
George L Annas, Regulatory Models for Human Embryo Cloning: The Free
Market, Professional Guidelines, and Government Restrictions, 4 KENNEDY INST.
ETHICS . 234, 242 (1994).
26 Children born through sexual reproduction differ genetically from both
parents for two reasons. First, as discussed in the text, each parent contributes only
1998-99]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
1. Cloning
Cloning also involves the transmission of genetic information from
"parent" to "offspring." Unlike sexual reproduction, however, cloning
replicates the genetic information of only one parent so that the offspring
is an exact genetic copy of that parent. All forms of cloning involve the
creation of "a precise genetic copy of a molecule, cell, plant, animal, or
human being."' As a result, unlike sexual reproduction, cloning has the
potential for reducing genetic diversity.
However, not all forms of cloning implicate the legal and ethical issues
raised by the creation of an adult mammal, such as Dolly. In fact, the term
"cloning," when applied to animals, actually encompasses four different
scientific processes: (1) molecular or gene cloning; (2) cellular cloning; (3)
blastomere separation or embryo splitting; and (4) nuclear transplantation
cloning.28 Of these four processes, only embryo splitting and nuclear
transplantation cloning raise concerns about the creation of adult human
clones.
a. Molecular Cloning
Molecular cloning is the process of replicating sections of DNA.
Because DNA is a molecule and genes are regions on the DNA molecule,
23 chromosomes to the child, one-half of the child's total genetic material.
Second, during the process of gamete production, crossing over occurs, creating
new configurations of genes on the chromosomes within the parents' germ cells.
Each parent contributes 23 chromosomes through his or her germ cell. Germ cells
are produced from 46-chromosome cells in a process known as meiosis. During
meiosis, certain segments of some pairs of chromosomes switch places, or "cross
over." Suppose the mother has a pair of chromosomes numbered 1 and 2, with
genes located on SegmentA of Chromosome 1 and Segment B of Chromosome 2.
Meiosis, in which the mother's egg cells are produced, splits up the 23 pairs of
chromosomes resulting in a total of 23 chromosomes. If there is no crossing over,
then Egg Cell #1 has Chromosome 1 with Segment A, and Egg Cell #2 has
Chromosome 2 with Segment B. Suppose crossing over occurs. Then, Segment A
changes place with Segment B. As a result, Egg Cell #1 now has Chromosome 1,
but with Segment B, not Segment A, on it. Thus, crossing over increases diversity
in a species because the reproductive cells may have chromosomes in which genes
have relocated on the chromosomes or chromosomes in which there has been no
relocation. Children bom of sexual union may inherit either type of chromosomal
arrangement. For a more detailed discussion of meiosis and crossing over, see
Wagner, supra note 12, at 31-36.
27 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 13.
28 See id. at 14-15.
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some scientists refer to this process of replicating portions of DNA as
molecular cloning29 while others dub it gene cloning." The production of
insulin for diabetics provides an example of how molecular cloning has
made possible a host of medical and scientific breakthroughs."
Insulin regulates the metabolism of sugar in the human body. Most
people produce insulin in their bodies so they have no problem in
regulating their bodies' metabolism of sugar. Diabetics, however, either do
not produce insulin or do so in amounts insufficient to monitor their
bodies' use of sugar. Thus, diabetics must take insulin. Before molecular
cloning, scientists had to obtain insulin from hog pancreases, which was
expensive and yielded limited supplies of insulin.32 Today, molecular
cloning allows scientists to produce large amounts of insulin at a lower
cost.
33
The first step in the molecular cloning of insulin (or any substance) is
locating the region or gene on the DNA that codes for insulin. Once the
gene is located, scientists must retrieve that gene from the DNA. In order
to do so, scientists must break open the cell and its nucleus and remove the
DNA. Then, they excise the gene or section of the DNA that codes for
insulin production. The second step involves splicing the insulin gene into
a cloning vector or vehicle. Cloning vectors "are relatively short DNA
molecules that can penetrate the wall of a living cell and can multiply
inside that cell."34 The end product of this process is a recombinant DNA
molecule35 composed of bacterial cell DNA on which the human gene for
29 See id. at 14; Larry L. Deaven, DNA Libraries: Recombinant Clones for
Mapping and Sequencing, in HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 12, at 219,
219-20.
11 See DRLICA, supra note 17, at 2.31 See id. at 9.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 Id. at 6-7 (stating that cloning vector DNA comes from bacterial cells).
35 A recombinant DNA molecule is "[a] stretch of DNA that includes DNA
from more than one source and can be replicated by a host cell without being
incorporated into the genome of the host cell." HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra
note 12, at 336. Recombinant DNA technology created an uproar in the 1970s
because the technology allowed scientists to combine DNA from different
organisms. There was concern that scientists might create toxic organisms capable
of causing death or other serious damage. Scientists participated in a voluntary
moratorium on recombinant DNA research while scientists and government
officials studied the implications of this new technology. See CLONING HUMAN
BEINGS, supra note 3, at 5.
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insulin is located. The recombinant DNA molecule is then inserted into a
host cell, typically a yeast or bacteria cell. Yeast and bacteria cells multiply
quickly,36 producing many duplicate yeast or bacteria cells, all with nuclei
containing copies of the recombinant DNA molecule. Because the host cell
DNA contains a gene for producing insulin, the host cell (and all of its
numerous copies) now can produce insulin.37
Thus, molecular cloning allows scientists to insert particular genes into
the DNA of simple organisms, such as bacteria, and create multiple copies
of the altered DNA. The technology has numerous scientific and medical
applications, including the production of insulin, as described above, and
other medicines, such as erythropoietin, which doctors use to treat anemia
resulting from kidney dialysis, and tissue plasminogen activator (tPA),
which dissolves blood clots resulting from heart attacks.3
b. Cell Cloning
Cell cloning involves duplication of any of the somatic cells of the
human body. 9 One cell is cultured and duplicated in the laboratory,
producing a cell line composed of identical copies of the original somatic
cell." Having multiple copies of one cell allows scientists to test the impact
of certain medicines on these cells before testing drugs on live human
subjects.
Today, recombinant DNA research operates within guidelines established by
the National Institutes offHealth. The guidelines focus on containment of organisms
to the laboratory and place the responsibility for monitoring on the institutions
involved in the research. See Recombinant DNA Research: Actions Under the
Guidelines, 62 Fed. Reg. 4782 (1997); Recombinant DNA Research: Actions
Under the Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 10,004 (1996); Recombinant DNA Research:
Actions Under the Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 1482 (1996); Recombinant DNA
Research: ActionsUnderthe Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 20,726 (1995); Recombinant
DNA Research: Actions Under the Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 40,170 (1994);
Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 59 Fed. Reg.
34,496 (1994).
316 See DRLICA, supra note 17, at 18.
31 The insulin example in the text is an elaboration on an example used in
DRLICA, supra note 17, at 9.31 See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 14.39 See id.
" See id.
41 See id.
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c. Blastomere Separation or Embryo Splitting
Blastomere separation, commonly known as embryo splitting, differs
in kind, not just degree, from other forms of cloning because its goal is the
production of live adult animal (or potentially human) clones. Essentially,
blastomere separation creates multiple copies of a single embryo, thus
artificially mimicking the natural process that results in twins or multiple
births.
Blastomere separation begins with the fertilization of an egg by a
sperm. Approximately a day and a half after fertilization,42 the one-celled
fertilized egg begins to divide. A blastomere is simply "each of the cells
produced when the fertilized egg cleaves into 2, then 4, 8, and 16 cells."43
Cell divisions continue, forming the blastocyst about four days after
fertilization. The significance of the blastocyst is that each of its cells-the
blastomeres-istotipotent, "possess[ing] the total potential to make an entire
new organism." Only very early embryonic cells have this capacity, if
separated, to each develop into a completely formed adult animal or human
organism. As the embryo develops, the cells begin to differentiate or
develop the characteristics of specialized cells, such as muscle, heart, and
liver cells. Although the birth of Dolly suggests that differentiated cells
may be used to create adult clones, it is much easierto create an adult clone
using cells that have not yet undergone differentiation. 45
Because of differentiation, blastomere separation usually occurs with
embryos ranging in size from two to eight cells. An example using an adult
sheep demonstrates how the process works. First, scientists remove and
fertilize an ovum from an adult sheep. After fertilization, the egg divides.
Suppose scientists decide to break apart the embryo at the four-cell stage.
This results in four blastomeres. Each of these blastomeres is then cultured
to grow into a multiple-cell embryo, which is reimplanted into an adult
female sheep. If four embryos result from the four blastomeres, four adult
sheep, all identical copies of one another, will be born.
Blastomere separation is not science fiction. Scientists already have
created adult animal clones from a single animal embryo. They began these
experiments in "artificial twinning" almost twenty years ago and have had
42 See ALAN TROUNSON & DAVID K. GARDNER, HANDBOOK OF IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION 69 (1993).
43 CLONING HuMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, app. at 1.
44 Id. at 15.
45 See id. at 15-16.
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success in producing normal adult sheep and cows. 6 Five years ago, a team
of scientists at George Washington University Medical Center created the
first human embryonic clones.47 Scientists were most successful in cloning
when beginning with two-celled embryos.4" However, none of the human
embryos created by blastomere separation was allowed to develop for more
than six days. 49
d. Nuclear Transplantation Cloning
Both blastomere separation and nuclear transplantation cloning create
the potential for developing adult animal or human clones, yet the birth of
Dolly through nuclear transplantation cloning created a public furor
unmatched by the announcement of the first case of embryo cloning. 0
The difference between blastomere separation andnucleartransplanta-
tion cloning really is one of degree. Blastomere separation requires a
breaking apart of the early embryo and culturing the blastomeres until they
develop into individual embryos. Nuclear transplantation cloning can be
done with either embryonic cells or fully differentiated adult animal or
(potentially) human cells.5
In Dolly's case, a team of scientists headed by Dr. Ian Wilmut and Dr.
Keith Campbell of the Roslin Institute in Scotland removed mammary
gland cells from an adult sheep. They cultured the mammary gland cells to
facilitate replication.52 The scientists then removed the nuclei from the ova
of adult sheep, leaving enucleated eggs, s and inserted the nuclei from the
adult mammary gland cells into the enucleated eggs. Dr. Wilmut and Dr.
Campbell tried this experiment 277 times. In twenty-nine cases, the eggs
with the mammary gland nuclei developed into sheep embryos.' Of these
reconstituted embryos, only one adult sheep was born, named Dolly,55
I See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 175-78.4 7See Kathy A. Fackelmann, Researchers 'Clone 'Human Embryos, 144 SCI.
NEWS 276,276 (1993).
48 See id.
49 See id.
1o See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
51 See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 15-16.
52 See id. at 22.
5 An enucleated egg is "an egg from which the nucleus has been removed." Id.
app. at2.
54 See id. at 22.
11 Dolly originally was named "6LL3." George J. Annas, Edward F- Utley
Professor of Public Health Law at Boston University School of Public Health,
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which was an identical copy of the sheep that had contributed its mammary
gland cell for nuclear transplantation. 6
B. How Did We Get Here?
57
1. A BrieffHistory of Cloning
Scientists did not set out to clone human beings. Scientific interest in
cloning arose out of curiosity about the intricacies of human development,
and dates back more than a hundred years to the latter part ofthe nineteenth
century. 8 At that time, embryologists began experimenting with frog eggs
in order to study embryological development.5 9 Because frogs produce
thousands of eggs at a time and those eggs are much larger than human
eggs, frog eggs were ideal candidates for the study of embryological
believes that Dr. Wilimut may have named the adult sheep clone "Dolly" in order
to make nuclear transplantation cloning appear less threatening:
Instead of naming Dolly by the scientific name used in the scientific
article-that is, "6LL3"-a name that would imply not an individual, but a
manufactured product, use of the word "Dolly" and the name "Dolly"
actually demystifies this whole concept and makes it look like a "doll," a
manufactured product to be sure, but yet one that brings great joy to
children and one that is not at all threatening to the human race.
Cloning Hearing, supra note 5, at 42 (statement of George J. Annas, Edward R.
Utley Professor of Public Health Law, Boston University School of Public Health)
(emphasis added). Wilmut dubbed her"Dolly" because she was created from udder
cells, the sheep's mammary glands. "In a moment of frivolity, as a wry joke,
Wilmut named her Dolly after Dolly Parton, who also was known, he said, for her
mammaries." KOLATA, supra note 2, at 3.
5 For a more detailed explanation of the steps involved in nuclear trans-
plantation cloning, see CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 15-22. See also
Gina Kolata, With Cloning ofa Sheep, the Ethical Ground Shifis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
24, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Ethical Shift] (describing the basis of Dr. Wilmut's
nuclear transplantation cloning procedure and debating the ethical implications of
such cloning); Whatever Next?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 1997, at 79 (describing Dr.
Wiimut's unique use of certain cells to produce a nuclear transplantation clone and
discussing the potential problems with the ability of a clone to age or remain
healthy).
57 This discussion of the evolution of scientific inquiry in the field of cloning
is drawn largely from KOLATA, supra note 2, and CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra
note 3, at 13-22.
58 See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 43.
59 See id. at 44.
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development.6" Embryologists had large supplies to fertilize, and the eggs
were large enough such that scientists did not require microscopes in order
to observe developmental stages in the frog embryo.6'
The developing frog embryos led embryologists to wonder about the
process of development from fertilized egg to differentiated cells, e.g.,
skin, brain, and heart cells, in a multi-cell organism.62 What triggered the
differentiation of cells? If an early embryo, for example at the four-cell
stage, were divided into its four constituent cells, would four identical
embryos develop? Or would only partial embryos develop because each of
the four cells already had begun the process of differentiation? And, why
could the process of differentiation of cells not be reversed?
In 1885, August Weismann, a zoology and comparative anatomy
professor at the University of Freiberg, developed a theory to account for
differentiation.63 He argued that as the fertilized egg divided, the resulting
cells lost genetic information with each cell division. According to his
theory, the fertilized egg started with the full complement of genetic
material; however, with each successive cell division, more genetic
information was lost.64 Weismann theorized that the loss of genetic
information explained how cells ended up performing certain functions.
The genes remaining in the cell's nucleus after cell division controlled
specific functions, e.g., brain activity. The loss of other genetic information
explained why the cell could perform only certain types of functions, i.e.,
why the cell had differentiated.65
In the early 1900s, Hans Spemann, a Nobel Prize winning embryolo-
gist, disproved Weismann's theory.' Spemann took the fertilized egg of a
salamander and, using a hair from his son's head, created a noose around
the middle of the egg.67 The "hair noose" forced the fertilized egg into a
dumbbell shape, with the nucleus of the egg on only one side of the noose.
Spemann watched as only the side with the nucleus engaged in cell
division. When that side reached the sixteen-cell stage, Spemann opened
the "hair noose," allowing a cell (with a nucleus) from the sixteen-cell
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 45.
63 See id. at 50.
64 See id. at 51.
65 see id.
66 See id. at 57.
67 See id. at 57-58.
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stage to move over to the side lacking a nucleus. 68 Spemann then used the
noose to separate the two sides. He discovered that two identical salaman-
der embryos developed.69 Spemann's experiment showed that cell division
in early embryos did not mean a loss of genetic material as Weismann had
hypothesized. Instead, atthe earliest embryonic stages, Spemann foundthat
inserting the nucleus of a salamander embryo into an enucleated cell, that
is, one lacking a nucleus, directed that cell to develop into a salamander
embryo.70
Spemann wondered whether his experiment with early embryonic
salamander cells would work with older embryonic or perhaps even adult
cells. Although he did not use the term "cloning," Spemann wanted to
insert the nuclei of older cells into enucleated egg cells, which is nuclear
transplantation cloning.7' Spemann, however, could not figure out how to
do so.
In 1952, Robert Briggs, an embryologist, accomplishedwhat Spemann
had suggested twelve years earlier. Briggs and Thomas J. King, a Ph.D.
student at New York University, conducted experiments on older embry-
onic cells taken from frog embryos having between 8000 and 16,000
cells.72 Briggs and King removed the nucleus from a frog ovum and then
inserted the nucleus of an older embryonic cell into the enucleated frog
egg. Briggs and King used 197 frog eggs, and ended up with thirty-five
frog embryos. 3 Of those thirty-five embryos, twenty-seven emerged as
tadpoles.74 Other scientists repeated the experiments, confirmingthe results
of Briggs and King; however, scientists discovered that the older and more
differentiated the cell, the less success they had with nuclear transplanta-
tion experiments.'
In 1962, John Gurdon seemed to overcome the hurdle of differentiation
by creating frogs from tadpole cells. Gurdon, a developmental biologist,
insertedthe nuclei from the intestines oftadpoles into enucleated frog eggs.
The eggs with the intestine nuclei developed into adult frogs.76 Gurdon's
68 See id. at 60.
69See id.
70 See id.
71 See id. at61.
7 See id. at 62-64.
73 See id. at 65.
' See id.
75 See id. at 66; CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 17-18.
76 See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 67; CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at
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experiment worked only two percent ofthe time,' but it proved significant
because he had used cells much more differentiated than those used by
Briggs and King.
Still, tadpoles are not adult frogs. In 1975, Gurdon tried to clone adult
frogs, but proved unsuccessful. He inserted the nuclei from adult frog skin
cells into enucleated frog eggs. In four percent of the nuclear transfers, a
tadpole resulted, but Gurdon's goal of creating an adult frog from the skin
cell of an adult frog eluded him.78
By the 1970s, scientists had cloned embryonic cells and had created
frogs from differentiated tadpole cells and tadpoles from adult frog skin
cells. However, no one had created an adult clone from the differentiated
cells of an adult animal. Moreover, no one had succeeded in creating a
mammalian clone.
That seemed to change in 1979 with the announcement by Karl
Illmensee, a famous and well-respected scientist from the University of
Geneva, that he had cloned three mice from early embryonic mouse cells. 79
Illmensee's announcement rocked the scientific community. Although he
had used embryonic cells, not skin or other highly differentiated cells from
an adult mouse, Illmensee was the first to produce a clone of a mammal."0
Earlier experiments hadused salamanders, frogs, andtadpoles. Illmensee's
results had potentially far-ranging implications for human cloning because
humans, like mice, are mammals.
flimensee's experiments came under fire. Members offIlmensee's own
lab began questioning his results, and the University of Geneva appointed
an international commission to investigate."' Although ultimately clearing
Ilimensee of fraud, the commission concluded that "because of the
sloppiness of Illmensee's documentation, the entire series of experiments
under question [was] 'scientifically worthless."' 82 In addition, no other
scientist proved capable of repeating fllmensee's cloning experiment. In
1984, Science published an article 3 by Davor Solter, a developmental
77 See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 67; CLoNING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at
17.
78 See CLONING HUMAN BEINGs, supra note 3, at 18.
79 See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 122.80S ee id. at 122-23.
81 See id. at 140.
82 Id. at 142.
83 James McGrath & Davor Solter, Inability of Mouse Blastomere Nuclei
Transferred to Enucleated Zygotes to Support Development in Vitro, 226 SCIENCE
1317 (1984).
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biologist, who had tried repeatedly, without success, to duplicate
Ilmensee's experiment. Solter stated that "'[c]loning of mammals, by
simple nuclear transfer, is biologically impossible."' 84 The international
commission's critique of Ilmensee's working methods, coupled with
Solter's and other scientists' results, sounded the death knell for cloning
research within prestigious academic and scientific communities.
Cloning continued, but it "became a pursuit of those who worked on
the edges of science. It was relegated to those who worked with farm
animals."85 The focus changed. In the prestigious labs and well-known
universities, scientists had pursued cloning as a way to understand the
process of human development. Scientists working with farm animals,
however, pursued cloning in order to create "better" animals.
Animal breeders faced a quandary in their attempts to create animals
with particular traits. The traditional approach is to inbreed animals that
have been selected for certain traits and then mate those inbred animals,
which tend to be feeble or runts, with healthy animals from the general
population, thereby merging genetic selection with hybrid vigor.
But when the hybrids are mated, the valuable traits from the inbred
animals tend to be diluted or lost. Embryo subdividing offered a solution:
It could allow breeders to multiply the valuable animals, including
hybrids, without the gamble of the genetic lottery. They could simply
subdivide the selected embryos, making multiple copies of a single hybrid
creature.
86
Theoretically, embryo splitting seemed like the solution to the genetic
lottery. In reality, the success rate dropped off sharply depending on the
size of the embryo. Scientists had good success with dividing embryos in
half: between sixty percent and eighty percent of these embryos developed
into lambs when implanted.87 However, when eight-cell embryos were
divided into eight cells, only five to ten percent of the implanted embryos
developed into live lambs.88
Nuclear transplantation cloning offered a solution to the inefficient
results produced by embryo splitting. In 1984, Steen Willadsen, a Danish
4 KOLATA, supra note 2, at 146 (quoting McGrath & Solter, supra note 83, at
1319).
85 Id. at 121.86 Id. at 178.
17 See id.
88 See id.
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scientist, created two cloned lambs using nuclear transplantation.8 9
Experiments on other mammals proved that scientists could successfully
produce adult sheep, cattle, pigs, and mice by inserting the nuclei from
early embryonic cells 9° into enucleated sheep, cattle, pig, and mice ova.9'
The technology appeared to be a gold mine. Companies such as W.R.
Grace and Company and Alta Genetics expanded into the business of
nuclear transplantation cloning. 2 Companies realized that they could turn
a huge profit by selling multiple copies of valuable embryos. For example,
suppose a valuable cattle embryo costs $500 to purchase.93 Ifa scientist can
remove the nucleus from each cell of that sixteen-cell cattle embryo, insert
each nucleus into an enucleated egg, and implant the resulting sixteen
embryos, the company selling the sixteen embryos would gain $8000 in
revenue, rather than $500.
The pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, however, never materialized.
First, nuclear transplantation cloning cost more than anticipated. 94 Second,
businesses overestimated market demand for these cloned, genetically
superior animals.95
Cloning research, however, did not disappear. Dr. Ian Wilmut
recognized the value of cloning in his research involving transgenic
animals. Transgenic animals "carry foreign genetic material placed by
scientists into their genomes (or the genomes of their ancestors)." 96 The
process is similar to that for molecular cloning and involves the insertion
of a gene that codes for the production of certain human drugs into the
animal's genome. As a result, an animal born with the foreign gene will
produce the human drug in its milk.
89 See id. at 183-84.
90 The success of nuclear transplantation using early embryonic cells varies
depending on the stage of embryonic development and the species involved. For
example, scientists have had no success in cloning adult mice using embryonic
cells after the eight-cell stage. In sheep and cows, however, scientists have created
adult sheep and cow clones using cells from 120-cell blastocysts. See CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 20.
9lSee CloningHearing, supra note 5, at 12 (statement ofDr. Harold E. Varmus,
Director, National Institutes ofHealth); CLONING HUMANBENGs, supra note 3, at
19-21.
92 See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 185-89.
93 This example is drawn from KOLATA, supra note 2, at 185.
94See id. at 188.
95See id.
9 6 SILVER, supra note 24, at 230.
' Scientists at Genzyme Transgenics Corporation in Framingham, Massa-
chusetts, have created transgenic goats that produce antithrombin I, which
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In 1991, Wilmut created a breed of sheep that produced alpha-1
antitrypsin, a drug used to treat a certain type of lung disease, in its milk.98
Wilmut found, however, that the process of creating transgenic animals,
which required direct injection of the transgene 9 into fertilized eggs, was
laborious and difficult. Wilmut did not set out to create Dolly; instead,
nuclear transplantation technology offered a solution to the problems with
existing transgenic technology.
[T]he current method of directly injecting genes into fertilized eggs is
inefficient. Not all injected eggs will develop into transgenic animals, and
then not all transgenic animals will express the added gene in the desired
manner. The production of transgenic livestock is slow and expensive.
Nuclear transfer would speed up the expansion of a successful transgenic
line, but, perhaps more importantly, it would allow more efficient
generation of transgenic animals in the first place. Foreign DNA, such as
a human gene, could be introduced into cell lines in culture and cells
expressing the transgene could be characterized and used as a source of
donor nuclei for cloning, and all offspring would likely express the human
gene. This, in fact, was the motivation behind the experiments that led to
the production of Dolly.'0
controls blood clotting in humans. Scientists at PPL Therapeutics, the firm that
funded much ofIan Wilmut's work at the Roslin Institute, have created transgenic
cows, whose milk contains alpha-lactalbumin, a human nutrient supplement. See
Genetic Engineering: Building to Order, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 1997, at 81.
Transgenically derived proteins should be safer than blood-derived products
because they will not be subject to the theoretical risk of transmission of
viruses, including H.I.V. and hepatitis. They should also be less costly than
biotechnology drugs produced by fermentation because one large mammal
can produce far more protein in her milk than the vast colonies of cells
needed for current processes. Biotechnology industry analysts say these
could substantially increase the market for therapeutic proteins, currently
about $7.6 billion dollars a year and expected to grow to $18.5 billion
dollars by 2000.
Lawrence M. Fisher, Cloned Animals Offer Companies a Faster Path to New
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,1997, at B8; see also CLONING HUMANBEINGS, supra
note 3, at 26 (discussing the scientific interest in improving farm livestock through
transgenic processes).
98See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 215.
9 Transgenes are the foreign genes added to the animal's genome. See SILVER,
supra note 24, at 230.
100 CLONINGHUMANBENGS, supra note 3, at26; see also Famed Sheep Cloner
Scoops Award, AGBIoTEcH NEWS & INFO., Mar. 1998 (visited Jan. 9, 1999)
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2. Why Is Dolly Different?
Dolly's birth was not the first instance in which scientists had
successfully produced animal clones through nuclear transplantation. For
more than sixty years, scientists have wonderedwhether the process of cell
differentiation can be reversed. Early embryonic cells-the blasto-
meres-possess the capacity to each develop into fully formed adult
animals. Once cell differentiation begins, however, cells, such as muscle
cells, develop specialized capacities, even though the cell nucleus contains
the full complement of genetic material necessary to create an adult animal
(or human being). Over the past sixty years, scientists have experimented
on various animals in order to determine whether differentiated cells could
be used to produce adult animal clones. They have successfully produced
clones of sheep, cows, and pigs.
If scientists have created other mammalian clones, then why is Dolly's
birth so significant?
To understand why this is important, we need to consider some of the
processes that occur during growth and development of the early embryo.
Fertilization of the mammalian egg by a sperm is rapidly followed by
successive cell divisions. The first few cells produced appear to be
identical to each other, but by the time the sheep embryo is implanted in
the womb it contains many millions of cells and several recognizable
tissues. As the fetus grows the cells differentiate further so that at the end
of pregnancy, the animal has hundreds of different cell types, almost all
with the same original genetic information as the original fertilized egg
but each with a specialized function.
Scientists have tended to assume that this gradual specialization (or
differentiation) was irreversible. Our previous nuclear transfer studies in
which we produced lambs derived from cells from sheep embryos showed
that some of the cells in the early embryo could be "reprogrammed" to
develop into all the cell types present in the whole animal. Our latest work
shows that cells at a much later stage of development, including some
from adult animals can also be reprogrammed in the same way.10'
Thus, Dolly's birth was a scientific breakthrough: her birth confirmed
scientists' suspicions that the process of cell differentiation could be
reversed.
<http://www.cabi.org/whatsnew/cloneani.htm#21> (discussing the motivation
behind the Dolly experiments).
101 Cloning Hearing, supra note 5, at 20 (statement of Dr. Ian Wilmut,
Embryologist, Roslin Institute, Scotland).
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Practically speaking, however, how does Dolly's birth differ from the
birth of identical twins created through artificial twinning or embryo
splitting? Perhaps the difference lies in the asexual nature of nuclear
transplantation "reproduction."
In nuclear transfer experiments, the situation is different .... Here,
we have genes that come solely from one donor, so both copies of the
genes are from a single individual. Now, that donor, of course, was at one
time derived from two parents, but the progeny of the experiment has the
same genetic constitution as the donor.
In a sense, this is like having a twin, separated in time.
10 2
However, embryo splitting also creates an identical copy of one
individual, albeit an "individual" not yet fully developed or recognized in
law as a person. Similarly, embryo splitting, like nuclear transplantation,
does not increase genetic diversity, which is ahallmark of sexual reproduc-
tion. While the embryo results from sexual reproduction, the cells which
split off from the embryo are identical copies of that embryo and are not
the product of sexual reproduction. The difference is one of timing. After
all, an adult human is the product of sexual reproduction, just as the
embryo is. In the case of embryo splitting, the cloning simply occurred
closer in time to the sexual reproduction.
An additional concern raised about cloning is that it deprives children
born as a result of cloning of the "right to an open future."
In an era not only of genetic determinism but also of potential genetic
discrimination, children saddled with another person's DNA might face
psychological and financial risks. Cloning is all too likely to violate what
the University of Arizonaphilosopher Joel Feinberg has called the child's
"right to an open future." '103
However, nuclear transplantation cloning using adult cells is not the only
form of cloning that carries this potential. For example, given advances in
cryopreservation,l°4 couples undergoing in-vitro fertilization0 5 could create
02 Id. at 13 (statement of Dr. Harold E. Varmus, Director, National Institutes
of Health).
103 Lori B. Andrews, Human Cloning: Assessing the Ethical and Legal
Quandaries, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUc., Feb. 13, 1998, at B4, B5.
0 Cryopreservation refers to freezing a living being with the hope of thawing
it in the future to bring it back to life. See SILVER, supra note 24, at 78.
o In vitro fertilization is "an assisted reproduction technique in which
fertilization is accomplished outside the body." CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra
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several copies of one embryo, implant one embryo, and cryopreserve the
remaining copies for later implantation, creating the possibility that
identical twins could be born, separated in time. 06 Therefore, embryo
splitting and nuclear transplantation cloning of both adult and embryonic
cells raise the specter of a generation of children born with predetermined
"genetic" destinies.10 7
Lee Silver, a professor at Princeton University, argues that cloning,
when coupled with genetic engineering, has made possible the genetic
alteration of human chromosomes.' Tinkering with human genes has far-
reaching implications for the species, i.e., the ability to create persons with
enhanced genetic traits.
There is a final consequence of cloning that is more significant and
powerful than any other use of the technology, one that has the potential
to change humankind: the genetic engineering of human beings. Without
cloning, genetic engineering is simply science fiction. But with cloning,
genetic engineering moves into the realm of reality... [M]ultiple cells
grown from a single embryo could be subjected to genetic engineering.
[.. T]hose that appear to be engineered as desired could be recognized
and picked out. Each single selected cell could be expanded by itself into
a clone of cells that provides sufficient material for the confirmation of
genetic integrity. Then, and only then, would one cell from this mass of
cells be used by means of nuclear transplantation to produce a new
embryo, which would develop into a new human being, with a special
genetic gift.'09
note 3, app. at 2.
"o In vitro fertilization is an expensive process with a low success rate-
approximately 19% per cycle of egg retrieval and implantation. See Ethical
Considerations, supra note 25, at 38S. Implanting more than one fertilized ova
increases the chances of a successful pregnancy. In order to implant more than one
fertilized ova, however, a woman must produce more than one egg per menstrual
cycle. Thus, many women take hormones in order to stimulate their ovaries to
produce multiple ova each menstrual cycle. Blastomere separation offers an
alternative to taking such hormones. Rather than using hormones to stimulate the
production of multiple eggs per cycle, scientists could fertilize one extracted egg
and create multiple clones through embryo splitting. See Fackelmann, supra note
47, at 276.
'
0 7 See Andrews, supra note 103, at B5.
'
08 See Ethical Shift, supra note 56, at Al.
109 SILVER, supra note 24, at 129-30; see alsoEthicalShit, supra note 56, atAl
(discussing the genetic engineering implications of cloning).
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Professor Silver's assertion about the real implications of cloning has
already proven to be true, at least for animals. In the summer of 1997,
Drs. Wilmut and Campbell announced the birth of Polly, a genetically
engineered clone."'0 All of Polly's body cells contained a human gene."'
Scientists at ABS Global, a Wisconsin corporation, have used similar
technology to create Gene, a genetically altered cloned calf."'2 Clon-
ing coupled with genetic engineering no longer is the stuff of science
fiction.
Of course, cloning genetically altered animals does not mean that the
technology can or will be used in humans. However, news from the Human
Genome Project" 3 about the scientific identification of genes" 4 that control
specific human traits may increase the public concern about using cloning
to "play God"" s or to alter "God-given" genetic traits."6 In addition,
Richard Seed, the Illinois physicist who announced his intention to open a
clinic to create human clones, clearly fueled public fears about man
interfering with God's role in human creation when he asserted that cloning
gave man the ability to become God.
"In the first two chapters of the Old Testament, we learned that God
made man in his own image. He intended the union of man and God. Is
this union spiritual or in body? I think it is talking about the body. That
we would become God in body and spirit."
Cloning is the first step, Seed says. The second step is manipulation
of the genetic material to reset the human body clock, to end the aging of
cells. "Indefinite life extension," he calls it Man becomes God." 7
11o See Tim Friend, Human Genes Put in Cloned Sheep, USA TODAY, July 25,
1997, at Al.
I See Gina Kolata, On Cloning Humans, "Never" Turns Swiftly Into "Why
Not," N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 2, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Kolata, Why Not].
"
2 See id.
11 See Lawton, supra note 12, at 371 ("The Human Genome Project is an
international research project, whose goal, simply stated, is to identify the location
of the 50,000 to 100,000 human genes that code for various human genetic traits
by mapping and sequencing the entire human genome.").
1 4 See id. at 376 n.31, 377 nn.34-35.
"
5 See CLONING HuMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 44-45.
"
6 See Kolata, Why Not, supra note 111, at Al.
"7 Gene Weingarten, Strange Egg; A House Call to the Mysterious Doctor
Seed, the Man Who Wants to Clone Humans, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1998, at F1.
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Seed's brash statements about cloning struck many as the ultimate hubris,
and his stated intention to open a human cloning clinic terrified most
listeners.
Nevertheless, the potential to combine cloning and genetic engineering
existedprior to Dolly's birth. For more than a decade, scientists have been
able to clone mammalian embryos using nuclear transfer technology. And
genetic engineering dates back to the early 1970s."8 In fact, because of
their totipotency, embryonic cells, not adult cells like Dolly's, produce
higher success rates in cloning."9
Although Drs. Wilnut and Campbell clearly broke a scientific barrier
with Dolly's birth, it is less clear whether Dolly's creation actually raised
novel legal and ethical issues.
Some commentators have suggested that the furor aroused by the new
possibility for cloning is out of proportion to most of the ethical, legal,
and moral issues it raises, since these same issues have been raised by
previous developments and are simply emerging again in a novel and
striking form. 12
0
Dolly's birth, however, struck a chord in the general population. Public
reaction might be partially due to the fact that enucleated eggs used in
nuclear transplantation cloning undergo division only after being exposed
to a signal external to the egg, such as an electrical current.'' Creating life
from cells stimulated by electricity conjures up images of Frankenstein."2
n8 See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 108.
"
9 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
120 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 2.
12 1 See id. at 21.
11 At the hearing held on cloning by the Subcommittee on Public Health and
Safety of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, George J. Annas
remarked that "[a] number of Senators have commented on Frankenstein and other
literary examples that have inflamed the public, and I cannot help but say that I
think they properly influence the public." Cloning Hearing, supra note 5, at 42
(statement of George Annas, Edward R. Utley Professor of Public Health Law,
Boston University School of Public Health). Dr. Willard Gaylin, an ethicist at the
Hastings Center in New York, commented that "'the Frankenstein factor"'
accounted for the public's reaction to Dr. Richard Seed, the Illinois physicist who
announced in late 1997 that he intended to open a clinic in order to produce the
first human clones. See Gina Kolata, Proposalfor Human Cloning Draws Dismay
and Disbelief, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1998, at A22 [hereinafter Kolata, Human
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It is more likely, however, that Dolly's birth simply surprised
scientists, who thought that cloning using adult somatic cells was imposs-
ible. Drs. Wilmut and Campbell accomplished what scientists had dreamed
of for more than half a century. Many had dismissed as impossible the
reversal of cell differentiation in adult animal somatic cells. Looked at in
this light, the publicity generated by Dolly's birth was no surprise. Because
few people outside the world of science really followed the vagaries of
cloning research, the birth came as a shock. Thus, Dolly's creation touched
people on a visceral level, making real those possibilities that once were
viewed as the province of nightmares and science fiction, "in which cloning
leads to dire, doomsday consequences."1 3
II. CURRENT EFFORTS TO BAN CLONING
A. The President's Reaction
The federal government's response to the announcement by Drs.
Wilmut and Campbell that they had created the first mammalian clone was
immediate. On February 24, 1997, President Clinton wrote to Dr. Harold
Shapiro, the Chair of the NBAC,124 and charged that body with the task of
examining the implications of Dolly's birth. President Clinton gave the
NBAC ninety days to explore the legal and ethical issues associated with
cloning and to formulate recommendations aimed at preventing the abuse
of cloning technology.'2 Concerned by what he perceived as a gap in
current federal funding bans on embryo research, President Clinton also
issued a directive to all executive departments and agencies prohibiting the
use of federal funds to clone human beings. 126
Cloning Proposal].
12 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 6 n.3 (referring to such popular
works as Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, as well as the films The Boys from
Brazil and Jurassic Park).
124 President Clinton originally created the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission ("NBAC") in the fall of 1995 to advise government agencies about
"bioethical issues arising from research on human biology and behavior," as well
as "applications, including the clinical applications, of that research." Exec. Order
No. 12,975 § 4(a)(1), (2), 60 Fed. Reg. 52,063 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
6601 (1998).
125 See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at Letter from the President.
126 See Memorandum on the Prohibition on Federal Funding for Cloning of
Human Beings, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 281 (Mar. 4, 1997).
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On June 9, 1997, Dr. Shapiro presented the NBAC's report, entitled
Cloning Human Beings,27 to President Clinton at a press conference in the
Rose Garden. The NBAC report recommended adoption of federal
legislation to ban the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning to create
children," 8 but the Commission cautioned against legislation that would
permanently preclude-the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer to create
cloned children.
As somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning could represent a means of
human reproduction for some people, limitations on that choice must be
made only when the societal benefits of prohibition clearly outweigh the
value of maintaining the private nature of such highly personal decisions.
Especially in light of some arguably compelling cases for attempting to
clone a human being using somatic cell nuclear transfer, the ethics of
policy making must strike a balance between the values society wishes to
reflect and issues of privacy and the freedom of individual choice.
29
The NBAC concluded that serious questions about the use of somatic cell
nuclear transfer to clone a child justified a limited ban on the technology. 30
The Commission wanted any legislation to include an expiration date. The
Commission believed that a permanent ban might unnecessarily infringe
on an individual's right to make decisions about procreation. 131 The NBAC
also cautioned that any legislation should be carefully drafted in order to
avoid limiting scientific research that does not implicate the issues raised
by human cloning.132
On the basis of the NBAC's recommendations, President Clinton sent
to Congress draft legislation, entitled the Cloning Prohibition Act of 1997
("CPA), 33 that bans the use of nuclear transplantation technology to create
a human being. The legislation covers both the private and public sectors
through the exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce.13
4
127 See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3.
128 See id. at 109.
29Id. at 107.
130 See id. at 109.
131 See id.
132 See id.
"I CLONING PROHIBITION ACT OF 1997, H.R. Doc. No. 105-97 (1997).
134 See id. § 2(c), at 6; infra Part III.A.
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The CPA makes it unlawful for "any person or other legal entity, public
or private, to perform or use somatic cell nuclear transfer with the intent of
introducing the product of that transfer into a woman's womb or in any
other way creating a human being." 3' The proposed legislation defines
"somatic cell nuclear transfer" as "the transfer of a cell nucleus from a
somatic cell into an egg- from which the nucleus has been removed," 136
which is the equivalent of nuclear transplantation cloning. Thus, the CPA
does not include blastomere separation as a form of prohibited cloning
activity. In addition, the CPA does not preclude the creation of clones from
human embryonic or adult cells, so long as the clone is not implanted in a
woman's uterus.
It is unclear why the CPA's prohibition contains the clause "or in any
other way creating a human being." '37 The absence of a comma prior to
"or" suggests that the prohibition extends to the creation of cloned children
by implantation in a woman's womb or by other, as yet unspecified
methods, such as development in a laboratory. What is clear, however, is
that the CPA allows all forms of human cloning research. 13 It simply
prohibits researchers from taking the next step and creating a newborn
human clone.
The CPA contains an expiration date, as suggested by the report of the
NBAC. The Act provides that its prohibitions only apply for five years
following enactment.'39 In addition, the NBAC is required to provide to the
President, within four and a halfyears ofthe CPA's enactment, information
about the scientific, ethical, and social implications of cloning, as well as
a recommendation about re-enacting prohibitions on cloning."4
The CPAimposes fines forpersons found liable for violating the Act.' 41
In addition, it provides for forfeiture of real or personal property used in
violating the Act. 42 Finally, the Act gives the Attorney General the right
to seek injunctive relief against any person about to violate the CPA's
prohibition on nuclear transplantation cloning.14 3 Responsibility for
'13 H.R. Doe. No. 105-97 § 5, at 7.
136 Id. § 4 (c), at 6-7.
137 Id. § 5, at 7.
13 8 See id. § 6, at 7.
139 See id. § 8, at 8.
140 See id. § 9, at 8.
'41 See id. § 7(a), at 7.
142 See id. § 7(c), at 7-8.
143 See id. § 7(b), at 7.
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enforcement rests with the Attorney General's Office,'" and no private
cause of action lies for violation of the Act.
B. The Legislative Response
Within two weeks of the announcement of Dolly's birth, Senator
Christopher Bond of Missouri and Representative Vein Ehlers of Michigan
introduced the first pieces of anti-cloning legislation in the Senate and
House, respectively." Since Drs. Wilmut and Campbell announced Dolly's
birth, a total of nine anti-cloning bills have been introduced in Congress."
Congress has yet to enact any anti-cloning legislation, in part due to
fundamental differences about the status of the human embryo. The debate
over cloning is being framed as a debate about abortion and embryo
research. As a result, it is unlikely that Congress will act anytime soon to
prohibit cloning.
Only three types of cloning raise questions about genetic determinism,
human individuality, and the proper scope of scientific inquiry: (1) human
embryo splitting; (2) nuclear transfer involving human embryonic cells;
and (3) nuclear transfer involving adult human cells. Only one piece of
legislation arguably addresses all three forms of cloning.4 An important
issue concerns why the current legislative efforts draw distinctions among
these three forms of cloning. In part, the answer lies in poor drafting.
Setting aside drafting errors, however, amore fundamental divide emerges.
There appear to be two lines of thought about the scope of federal anti-
cloning legislation. One group of legislators opposes embryo research.
They believe that embryos deserve respect as human life and that tamper-
ing with human embryos violates fundamental precepts of a good society.
144See id. § 7(d), at 8.
145 See id. § 10, at 8.146 See S. 368, 105th Cong. (1997); Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act,
H.R. 922, 105th Cong. (1997); Human Cloning Prohibition Act, H.R. 923, 105th
Cong. (1997).
47 See Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act of 1998, S. 1611, 105th
Cong. (1998); Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act of 1998, S. 1602,
105thCong. (1998); Human CloningProhibitionAct, S. 1601,105th Cong. (1998);
Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 1998, S. 1599, 105th Cong. (1998); Human
Cloning Prohibition Act, S. 1574, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 368, 105th Cong. (1997);
Human Cloning ResearchProhibitionAct, H.R. 3133,105th Cong. (1998); Human
Cloning Prohibition Act, H.R. 923,105th Cong. (1997); Human Cloning Research
Prohibition Act, H.R. 922, 105th Cong. (1997).
'
48 See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
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As a result, they object to any form of human cloning, whether it involves
pure research or efforts to implant cloned embryos in order to create an
adult human clone.4 9 Other members of Congress are concerned with the
end result of cloning, which is the creation of an adult human clone. As a
result, implantation of cloned embryos, not creation of those embryos, is
the focus of their legislative efforts. 5 ' Ofdourse, this debate is also shaped,
in part, by current federal funding bans on embryo research.15' Thus,
legislative restrictions may vary depending on whether the proposed bill
merely bans federal funding for cloning or imposes an outright prohibition
on cloning by both public and private entities. In order to understand the
controversy underlying the cloning debate, it is necessary to understand
what activities the various pieces of legislation actually prohibit.
1. Prohibition ofAdult Cell Nuclear Transplantation Cloning
While the NBAC began its work, Senator Christopher Bond of
Missouri introduced the first piece of federal anti-cloning legislation in the
U.S. Senate. On February 27, 1997, Senator Bond introduced a bill ("Bond
Act") that would ban the use of federal funds "for research with respect to
the cloning of a human individual."'52 The Bond Act defines "cloning" as
"the replication of a human individual by the taking of a cell with genetic
material and the cultivation of the cell through the egg, embryo, fetal, and
newborn stages into a new human individual."'53 The Bond Act was
referred to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources. 54
At first blush, the definition of cloning provided in the Bond Act
appears to cover both blastomere separation and nuclear transplantation
cloning because it includes the use of any cell with genetic material.
Unfortunately, the use of the term "human individual" raises questions.
Does the bill only cover the use of cells with genetic material from human
individuals who have been born, i.e., considered persons under the law?
The Act's own language supports this conclusion. Section l(b) defines
cloning as the duplication of the cell of a human individual and "cultivation
of the cell through the egg, embryo, fetal, and newborn stages into a new
human individual"'5 5 Thus, a human individual emerges only after
49 See infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
"Io See infra notes 187-93 and accompanying text.
151 See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
152 S. 368, 105th Cong. § 1(a) (1997).
153 Id. § l(b).
" See S. 368.
155 Id. § 1(b) (emphasis added).
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completion of the embryonic, fetal, and newborn stages. If this interpreta-
tion is correct, then the Bond Act restricts funding only to the cloning
technology used to create Dolly: it does not ban the use of federal funds for
nucleartransplantation cloning of embryos or embryo splitting. In addition,
it does not preclude the use of federal funds for cloning research, so long
as the scientists involved do not implant the clone in an effort to create a
new human individual Yet, Senator Bond was one of the first members of
Congress to criticize the NBAC's failure to address embryonic cloning in
its report to the President.
The [NBAC] report drew quick fire from Sen. Christopher S. Bond (R-
Mo.), who expressed disappointment that the commission did not call for
outlawing the cloning of human embryos for research-a practice opposed
by some who believe that life begins at conception.
"I had hoped the federal ethics commission would not be afraid to
make a strong moral statement," Bond said in a news release. "But when
it came to the tough questions, they punted, and now it will be up to
Congress and state legislatures to resolve those issues."'156
Given his strong response to the NBAC's report, itis clearthat Senator
Bond intended to cover embryonic cloning in his proposed legislation, but
failed to properly define cloning to cover the activities that he intended to
ban.1
5 7
2. Prohibition ofAdult Cell and
Embryonic Nuclear Transplantation Cloning
Early in March of 1997, Representative Vern Ehlers of Michigan
introduced the first two anti-cloning bills in the House, one imposing a
federal funding ban on cloning and one banning cloning entirely. Ehlers's
Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act58 ("Funding Act") originally
banned the use of federal funds "to conduct or support any project of
research that involves the use of a human somatic cell for the process of
producing a human clone."' 59
156 Rick Weiss, Bioethics Panel Urges Ban on Human Cloning: MedicalRisks,
Ethical Concerns Merit Federal Law with Periodic Reviews, Board Concludes,
WASH. POST, June 8, 1997, at A19.
157 See infra Part IL.B.4.b.
"' Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act, H.IL 922, 105th Cong. (1997).
159Id. § 2.
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The Funding Act was referred to both the House Commerce and House
Science Committees. In July of 1997, the Science Committee, on a voice
vote, approved an amended version of Ehlers's Funding Act ("Amended
Funding Act").11 The Amended Funding Act refines the federal funding
prohibition to cover research "that includes the use of human somatic cell
nuclear transfertechnology to produce an embryo."' 6' Ehlers's Funding Act
only covered research that produced a human clone: it did not ban the use
of federal funds for cloning experiments on human embryos. Thus, the
Funding Act would not have precluded federal funding for researchers who
use nuclear transplantation on embryos, but do not implant the cloned
embryos, because a human clone would not result. The Amended Funding
Act makes it clear that the funding ban extends to nuclear transfer cloning
experiments involving human embryos.
The Amended Funding Act also defines "human somatic cell nuclear
transfer" as "transferring the nucleus of a human somatic cell into an
oocyte from which the nucleus has been removed or rendered inert."' 62
Defining "somatic cell" to include the "cell of an embryo, fetus, child, or
adult' 63 clearly signals the intent to prohibit nuclear transplantation
cloning using either adult or embryonic cells. To allay fears of the
biotechnology industry, the Amended Funding Act specifically provides
that the Act shall not restrict scientific research involving "the use of
somatic cell nuclear transfer or other cloning technologies to clone
molecules, DNA, cells other than human embryo cells, or tissues[.]' '56
Representative Ehlers also introduced the Human Cloning Prohibition
Act ("Cloning Act"), 161 which imposes an outright ban on nuclear
16 On January 28, 1998, Representative Cliff Steams of Florida and Repre-
sentative Roger Wicker of Mississippi introduced the Human Cloning Research
Prohibition Act ("Steams/Wicker Act"), legislation almost identical to Ehlers's
Amended Funding Act. See Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act, H.R. 3133,
105th Cong. (1998). The main difference is a change in the language describing the
prohibited activities. The Stearns/Wicker Act prohibits the use of federal funds
for "research that includes the use of human somatic cell nuclear transfer
technology to produce an oocyte that is undergoing cell division toward
development of a fetus." Id. § 2(a). Ehlers's Amended Funding Act contains a
prohibition on federal funding of somatic nuclear transfer "to produce an embryo."
H.R. 922 § 2(a).
"
1 H.R.PEP.No. 105-239, at2 (1997) (stating the amended version ofH.R. 922
§ 2(a)).
162 Id. (stating the amended version of H.R. 922 § 2(a)(1)).
63 Id. (stating the amended version of H.R. 922 § 2(a)(2)).
'64 Id. (stating the amended version of H.R. 922 § (4)(1)).
165 Human Cloning Prohibition Act, H.R. 923, 105th Cong. (1997).
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transplantation cloning. The Cloning Act deems it unlawful "for any person
to use a human somatic cell for the process of producing a human clone' 1
and imposes a maximum fine of $5000 for such unlawful conduct. 67
Despite the early flurry of legislative activity, congressional attention
to cloning waned as the fall of 1997 approached. Congress's reaction
seemed to mirror that of the general public. Lori Andrews, a noted legal
scholar on issues of reproduction, observed that the time from "horrified
negation" to "very slow but steady acceptance ' 168 of cloning by the public
as a "reproductive technology" had been strikingly brief.69 "'I absolutely
think the tenor has changed,' Ms. Andrews said. People who said human
cloning would never be done 'are now saying, "Well, the risks aren't that
great," she said.' "170 This short-lived "acceptance" (or perhaps inattention)
to cloning changed with the appearance of Dr. Seed.
In December of 1997, Dr. Richard Seed, an Illinois physicist, told the
audience at a Chicago meeting on the legal and ethical implications of
cloning that he planned to open a clinic to perform human cloning.'
7 1
Apparently, members of the audience ignored him, but an interview on
National Public Radio in early January of 1998172 made Dr. Seed a
household name and revived the debate on cloning.
Dr. Seed does not consider cloning to be unethical. In his opinion,
cloning offers a way for "man to become one with God."'"3 By cloning
himself, man can "have almost as much knowledge and almost as much
166 Id. § 2(a).
167 See id. § 2(b).
68 Dr. Sophia Kleegman and Dr. Sherwin Kaufman have developed a theory
that the public moves through different stages toward acceptance of new
reproductive technologies. At first, the public reacts with "horrified negation."
After a period of time, however, the public passes into a stage known as "negation
without horror." Finally, the public comes to accept the new technology, passing
from "slow and gradual curiosity, study, evaluation" to "a very slow and steady
acceptance." See Kolata, Why Not, supra note 111, at A17 (discussing SOPHIA J.
KLEEGMAN & SHERWIN A. KAUFMAN, INFERTILITY IN WOMEN: DIAGNOSIS AND
TREATMENT (1966)).
169 Id. (quoting Lori Andrews, Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of
Law).
7I Id. (quoting Lori Andrews, Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of
Law).
171 See Kolata, Human Cloning Proposal, supra note 122, app. at 22.
"
72Human CloningEfforts (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 7, 1998) (interview ofDr.
Richard Seed by Jo Palca, an NPR reporter).
173 Id.
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power as God."'174 The outrageousness of Dr. Seed's statements thrust him
into the limelight. Major newspapers and television and radio shows all
carried stories about him.175 Some questionedwhether Dr. Seed, a physicist
with many failed business endeavors, no capital of his own, and a
personality kindly described as "eccentric," could actually clone a human
being.76 The media certainly created a frenzy with its reporting on Dr.
Seed. Nonetheless, this coverage had an important effect-it revived the
public discussion of cloning. And Congress, once again, responded with a
flurry of legislation.
On February 3, 1998, Senator Bond introduced another piece of anti-
cloning legislation, entitled the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 1998,177
which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. On the same day,
Senate Majority LeaderTrent Lott introduced identical legislation, entitled
the Human Cloning Prohibition Act ("Bond/Lott Act"), 178 which, on
February 4, was placed on the Senate's calendar.
The Bond/Lott Act imposes criminal and civil penalties 179 against
"'any person or entity, public or private, in or affecting interstate com-
merce, [who] use[s] human somatic cell nuclear transfer technology.'" 8 0
The Act also defines "human somatic cell nuclear transfer technology" as
the transfer of human somatic cell nuclear material into an enucleated
human egg to produce an embryo;'"' thus, embryo splitting is not within the
174 Id.
75 See Kolata, Human CloningProposal, supra note 122, atA22; Dirk Johnson,
Eccentric 's Hubris Set Off Global Frenzy over Cloning, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 24, 1998,
at Al; J. Madeleine Nash, Cloning's Kevorkian, TIME, Jan. 19, 1998, at 58;
Weingarten, supra note 117, at F01.
176 See Johnson, supra note 175; Nash, supra note 175.
"One of the great subjects for journalistic review," Mr. Caplan said, "will
be how this man, with no money, no standing with physicists, no
organizational skills-an oddball, really-how this man suddenly turns into
this authority chatting on the nightly news.
"Seed was legitimated by the very people who should have been
scrutinizing him."
Johnson, supra note 175, at Al (quoting Arthur Caplan, Director of the Center for
Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania).
'.. Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 1998, S. 1599, 105th Cong. (1998).
178 Human Cloning Prohibition Act, S. 1601, 105th Cong. (1998).
179 A person convicted under the Human Cloning Prohibition Act is subject to
a maximum of 10 years in prison, fines amounting to twice the gross pecuniary
gain obtained from the illegal cloning activity, or both. See id. § 3(a).
180 Id.
181 I. d
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Act's purview. Finally, the Bond/Lott Act creates the National Commission
to Promote a National Dialogue on Bioethics, explains the Commission's
duties, and provides the qualifications and selection methods for Commis-
sion members. 182 Additionally, the Act requires the Commission to report
annually to Congress.13
In an unusual move, the Bond/Lott Act came up for debate on the
Senate floor without first wending its way through a Senate committee.8 4
Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts and Senator Dianne Feinstein of
California filibustered the Act in order to prevent floor debate.8 5 Support-
ers of the Bond/Lott Act proved unable to obtain the necessary sixty votes
to end the filibuster, in part because many senators expressed concern that
the Act would unnecessarily impede scientific research. 6
The cloning legislation introduced by Senators Feinstein and Kennedy
represents a very different conception of the balance between scientific
inquiry and embryonic rights than the view reflected in the Bond/Lott Act.
In early February of 1998, Senators Feinstein and Kennedy introduced the
Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act of 1998 ("Feinstein/Kennedy
Act").8 7 The Feinstein/Kennedy Act is quite similar to the CPA. It imposes
stiff fines against any person or legal entity that attempts to implant an
embryo created by nuclear transplantation cloning.88 Both acts contain the
182 See id. § 4(a)-(f).
183 See id. § 4(g).
84 See Chris Black, Senate Vote Effectively Kills GOP Bill to Ban Human
Cloning, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 12, 1998, at A3.
185 See id.
'
86 The American Heart Association, the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, the Amer-
ican Cancer Society, 27 Nobel Prize winners, as well as researchers attheNational
Institutes of Health ("NIH") figured in the opposition to the Bond/Lott Act. See id.;
Vincent Kiernan, Senate Rejects Bill to Ban Human Cloning, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., Feb. 20, 1998, at A40; Finlay Lewis, Concerns over Attempts to Ban
Human Cloning Top LegislativeAgenda ofBiotech Industry, COPLEYNEWS SERV.,
Mar. 5, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, CurNws File.
187 Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act of 1998, S. 1602, 105th Cong.
(1998). On February 3, 1998, Senators Feinstein and Kennedy introduced the
Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act of 1998, which was referred to the
Senate's Committee on Labor and Human Resources. See id. A day later, they
introduced nearly identical legislation, which, on February 5, 1998, was placed on
the Senate's calendar. See Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act of 1998,
S. 1611, 105th Cong. (1998).
"'
88 See S. 1611 § 4. Violators are subject to fines of one million dollars or three
times the" 'gross pecuniary gain or loss resulting from the violation,' "whichever
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same congressional findings, although the Feinstein/Kennedy Act adds
findings demonstrating cloning's effect on interstate commerce. 8 9 Unlike
the CPA,'90 the Feinstein/Kennedy Act clearly prohibits only the implanta-
tion of a cloned embryo created through nuclear transplantation technol-
ogy, stating, "'[i]t shall be unlawful for any person or other legal entity,
public or private-(l) to implant or attempt to implant the product of
somatic cell nuclear transfer into a woman's uterus .... " "'191 The Act also
prohibits the use of federal funds to create human clones for such
implantation.192
This language permits research on both human embryonic and adult
cells using nuclear transfer technology, provided scientists do not implant
the resulting clone. In addition, nothing in the Feinstein/Kennedy Act
prevents clinics from engaging in embryo splitting research or creating a
human clone through embryo splitting.
The Feinstein/Kennedy Act, like the CPA, requires the NBAC to report
on the scientific, ethical, and social implications of cloning. 93 Unlike the
Bond/Lott Act, the Feinstein/Kennedy Act does not permanently ban the
implantation of embryos created through nuclear transfer. 94 The
Feinstein/Kennedy Act's prohibitions expire within ten years of
enactment; 9 s the CPA's prohibitions terminate within five years of
enactment. 96 Finally, unlike any other piece of anti-cloning legislation,
including the CPA, the Feinstein/Kennedy Act contains a preemption
provision, making clear its intent to preempt all state and local laws
prohibiting or restricting somatic cell nuclear transfer or other forms of
cloning research.197
is greater. Id. The Attorney General may apply for injunctive relief against
violators. See id. Finally, both real and personal property used in violating the Act
is subject to forfeiture. See id.
89 See id. § 2(13).
191 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
191 S. 1611 § 4.
192 See id.
193 See id.
'94 Compare Human Cloning Prohibition Act, S. 1601, 105th Cong. § 3(a)
(1998), with S. 1611 § 4.
95 SeeS. 1611 §4.
196 See CLONING PROHIBITION ACT OF 1997, H.R. DOC. No. 105-97 § 8, at 8
(1997).
197See S. 1611 § 4.
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3. Prohibition ofNuclear Transplantation
Cloning and Embryo Splitting
The Human Cloning Prohibition Act ("Campbell Act"), introduced by
Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado,' 8 is the only anti-cloning
bill that arguably covers embryo splitting, as well as nuclear transfer using
human embryonic or adult cells. Because the Act is so poorly drafted,
however, Senator Campbell's legislative intentions are less than clear.'
The Campbell Act bans the use of federal funds to "knowingly conduct
or support any project of research the purpose ofwhich is to clone a human
being or otherwise create a human embryo."2' The Act also imposes civil
penalties not exceeding $5000 for each violation, and makes violators
ineligible for any federal research money for a period of five years
following the violation.20 '
4. Evaluation of Current Legislative Efforts
A number of problems plague the current legislative proposals to
regulate or ban cloning. First, a number of states have either enacted or
introduced cloning legislation, yet few of the federal bills address the
preemption question. Second, several bills suffer from sloppy or imprecise
drafting, resulting in unintended consequences. Finally, even those bills
that accurately reflect their sponsors' intent do not provide adequate
philosophical justification for distinguishing among the various forms of
cloning.
a. Preemption02
Only the Feinstein/Kennedy Act contains a preemption provision. The
Act provides for the preemption of"'any State or local law that prohibits
198 Human Cloning Prohibition Act, S. 1574, 105th Cong. (1998).
,99 See infra Part II.B.4.b.
200S. 1574 §3(b). The bill contains a typographical error so that there are two
section 3s. The first is entitled "Prohibition on Human Cloning," while the second
is called "Enforcement." The prohibitions referred to above appear in the first
"section 3."
201 See id. §3(a), (b). The fines and ineligibility provisions referred to above
appear in the second "section 3."
202 This Article does not address the state Commerce Clause issues. First, if
Congress does not regulate or ban cloning, may the states do so, or would state
regulation violate the dormant Commerce Clause? Second, if Congress does
regulate, but fails to include express language preempting state regulation, would
federal law preempt state legislation?
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or restricts research regarding, or practices constituting, somatic cell
nuclear transfer, mitochondrial or cytoplasmic therapy, or the cloning of
molecules, DNA, cells, tissues, organs, plants, animals, or humans."' 203
This broad preemption language would apply to most of the current state
anti-cloning laws and proposed legislation. First, the Act preempts state
laws that restrict nuclear transfer research of any kind. Second, it also
preempts state laws that ban any form of human cloning, including embryo
splitting. The Feinstein/Kennedy Act clearly indicates that the states should
not regulate in this area, at least for the ten-year period of the Act.2"
There are important reasons for Congress to address expressly the
preemption question in any anti-cloning legislation. First, California,
Rhode Island, and Michigan already have enacted legislation that either
bans human cloning or imposes a moratorium on cloning activities within
the state, while Missouri bans the use of state funds for human cloning
research.05 In addition, legislators in a number of other states have
203 Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act, S. 1611, 105th Cong. § 4
(1998).
204 See id.
205 In 1997, California adopted a five-year moratorium on nuclear trans-
plantation cloning. See CAL.HEALTH &SAFETYCODE § 24185 (West Supp. 1998).
The law amends California's Health and Safety Code to provide monetary penalties
for cloning. See id. § 24187. Cloning is defined as the transfer of the nucleus of an
adult differentiated cell into an enucleated human ovum. Penalties range from
$250,000 for individual offenders to $1 million for corporate offenders, including
hospitals and clinics. See id. California law also provides that businesses licensed
pursuant to the provisions of California's Business and Professions Code will have
their licenses revoked for violating the law's five-year cloning moratorium. See
CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE §§ 16004, 16105 (West 1997).
In 1998, Rhode Island followed California's lead by imposing a five-year
moratorium on human cloning. Unlike California, however, Rhode Island enacted
legislation that covers embryo splitting, as well as nuclear transplantation cloning
of both embryonic and adult cells. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-16.4-1 (1998) ("The
purpose of this legislation is to place a ban on the creation of a human being
through division of a blastocyst, zygote, or embryo or somatic cell nuclear transfer
... ."). The Act's definition of "somatic cell" as "any cell of a conceptus, embryo,
fetus, child or adult" makes clear the legislature's intent to prohibit nuclear
transplantation cloning using either embryonic or adult human somatic cells. Id. §
23-16.4-2(B). Penalties range from $250,000 for individual offenders to $1 million
for corporate offenders. See id. § 23-16.4-3(A), (B).
Michigan also enacted anti-cloning legislation in 1998. Unlike California and
Rhode Island, Michigan did not include a sunset clause in its legislation. Instead,
Michigan has imposed an outright ban on nuclear transplantation cloning,
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introduced various anti-cloning bills. 6 Most of the bills make cloning a
apparently involving either embryonic or adult human somatic cells. See MCH.
COMP. LAWS § 333.16274(5)(c) (1998) (defining a human somatic cell as "a cell
of a developing or fully developed human being"). Thus, embryo splitting is not
a prohibited activity under Michigan law. Michigan also bans the use of state funds
for cloning. See id. § 333.26403. Finally, Michigan provides administrative and
civil penalties for violation of the law's cloning prohibition by health professionals
licensed pursuant to the state's Public Health Code. See id. §§ 333.16274(3),
333.16275.
While Missouri does not ban human cloning, the state recently enacted
legislation prohibiting the use of state money to fund human cloning research. See
Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.217 (1998). Cloning is defined as "the replication of a human
person by taking a cell with genetic material and cultivating such cell through the
egg, embryo, fetal and newbom stages of development into a new human person."
Id. 2o1 See S.B. 511, 1997 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ala. 1997) (defining cloning as "the act
of reproducing a being of like genetic constitution from a single somatic cell by
repeated cell division"); H.B. 1082, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1997); H.B. 5475, 1998
Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1998) (defining cloning as the implantation ofan embryo created
through nuclear transplantation); S.B. 241, 139th Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. § 1 (Del.
1998) (defining cloning as the "creat[ion] [of] or attempt to create a human child
using somatic cell nuclear transfer"); H.B. 1237, 1997 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Fla. 1997)
(defining cloning a human being as "creating a new individual by using the
complete nuclear genetic material of an existing human being to create a second
genetic duplicate of that human being"); S.B. 1230, 90th Gen. Ass., 1997-98 Reg.
Sess. § 5 (Ill. 1998) (defining "human cloning" as the "intentional production of
a newly fertilized human egg cell that is genetically identical to another human
being, living or dead"); H.B. 2235, 90th Gen. Ass., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997);
H.B. 1829, 90th Gen. Ass., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997); H.B. 932, 1998 Reg.
Sess. § 1 (Md. 1998) (banning state funding for cloning); H.J.R. 11, 1998 Reg.
Sess. (Md. 1998) (stating the intent of the legislature to prohibit state funding for
cloning): H.J.R 28, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997); S.B. 2423, 80th Reg. Sess., 1998
Reg. Sess. § 1(3) (Minn. 1998) (defining cloning to include nuclear transplantation
involving "human cell[s] from whatever source"); H.B. 2730, 80th Reg. Sess.,
1998 Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1998); A.B. 2849, 207th Leg. (N.J. 1997); S.B. 782, 1997
Sess. (N.C. 1997) (defining cloning more broadly than the activities prohibited by
the bill's language); A.B. 329,208th Leg. § 1 (N.J. 1998) (defining cloning as "the
replication of a human individual by cultivating a cell with genetic material through
the egg, embryo, fetal and newborn stages into a new human individual"); S.B.
1017, 69th Leg. Ass., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997) (containing one of the most
restrictive definitions of cloning, limiting the prohibited activity to creation of a
live clone by using an adult, differentiated cell); H.B. 3036, 113 Gen. Ass. § 1(A)
(S.C. 1998) (defining cloning as "the growing or creation of a human being from
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criminal offense, typically a felony.207 Given the variety of state anti-
cloning bills, Congress needs to make clear what role the states may play,
if any, in restricting or banning various kinds of cloning technology.
Second, uniformity is critical in this area of law.0 8 To begin with,
poorly drafted legislation on the state level may unnecessarily impede
legitimate scientific work. More importantly, cloning is unlike other
problems such as gun control. The first human clone has not yet been
created. This provides policymakers with a period of time in which to
investigate the legal, ethical, and social implications of cloning.2" If there
is a patchwork of state legislation, with some states allowing certain
technologies and others banning them, there may be a "race to the bottom."
In other words, a state may lower legal, ethical, and social safeguards
a single cell or cells of a genetically identical human being through asexual
reproduction"); S.B. 410, 73d Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 1997).
Some states have called upon the federal government to regulate cloning
technology. See S.J.R 58, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1997) ("[W]e urge the Congress
of the United States to take the appropriate action to prohibit the cloning of human
beings in this country ...... "); S.J.R. 14, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997) (stating "[t]he
Legislature of the State of California memorializes the President and the Congress
of the United States to act immediately and swiftly to ban, outlaw, and take all
necessary means to prevent the cloning of human beings .... ).
2
"
7 See, e.g., S.B. 511, 1997 Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ala. 1997) (making cloning of a
human being a Class B felony); H.B. 5475, 1998 Reg. Sess. § l(c) (Conn. 1998)
(making cloning of a human being a class D felony); H.B. 1237, 1997 Reg. Sess.
§ 1 (Fla. 1997) (defining cloning or attempting to clone any human being as a
felony ofthe first degree); S.B. 1230,90th Gen. Ass., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. § 10 (111.
1998); H.B. 1829, 90th Gen. Ass., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. § 10 (111. 1997) (deeming
cloning a human being or using public funds to engage in such activity a Class 4
felony); S.B. 2423, 80th Reg. Sess., 1998 Reg. Sess. § 1(2) (Minn. 1998) (making
it a felony to clone a human being); H.B. 996, 1998 Reg. Sess. § 5 (Miss. 1998)
(making cloning a felony punishable by no more than five years in prison, a
$50,000 fine, or both); A.B. 329, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1998) (making cloning of a
human being a first degree crime, punishable by no more than 20 years in prison,
a $100,000 fine, orboth); S.B. 782, 1997 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1997) (declaring cloning
to be a Class E felony); H.B. 3036, 113th Gen. Ass. § 1(C ) (S.C. 1998) (making
cloning a felony that carries penalties of no more than five years in prison, a fine
of $5,000, or both); S.B. 410, 73rd Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 1997) (making
cloning a felony with penalties ranging from one to five years in prison, fines up
to $10,000, or both).208 See discussion infra Part HI.A.2.
209 The need for such investigation is clearly set forth in the NBAC's recom-
mendations. See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 107-10.
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against human cloning in order to attract revenues for the state. Once the
first human clone has been created, it will prove extraordinarily difficult to
turn back the clock.
b. Drafting Errors
Most of the current legislative proposals to regulate or ban cloning
suffer, in varying degrees, from either sloppy drafting and/or questionable
distinctions. The Bond Act, Ehlers's Funding Act, and Ehlers's Cloning
Act are less than 100 words long, hardly adequate to address a subject as
complex as cloning.210 In addition, neither Ehlers's Funding Act nor his
Cloning Act defines the terms "clone" or "somatic cell."
A number of the bills are poorly written, leading to unintended
consequences. Both the Bond Act and the Campbell Act use circular
definitions of cloning, thereby excluding activities that the sponsors
apparently desired to include in the bills' prohibitions.2 ' For example, the
Campbell Act defines "cloning" as the creation of a human being by using
somatic cell nuclear transfer to "initiate a pregnancy that could result inthe
birth of a human being."2 12 This definition only prohibits cloning that
results in the live birth of a cloned child; it does not restrict any form of
cloning research. Yet, the Campbell Act prohibits "research forthe purpose
of cloning a human being or otherwise creating a human embryo."z 3 The
absence of a comma before the "or" indicates that the drafter intended to
ban research that otherwise would create a human embryo. It makes little
sense to define "cloning" to allow all forms of cloning, including embry-
onic cloning, so long as a child is not born as a result, yet ban any research
that leads to the creation of a human embryo. The two prohibitions conflict
with one another. In addition, the Campbell Act seems to ban in vitro
fertilization, which creates a human embryo by combining human sperm
and egg outside the human body.214
210 See S. 368, 105th Cong. (1997); Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act,
H.R. 922, 105th Cong. (1997); Human Cloning Prohibition Act, H.R. 923, 105th
Cong. (1997).211 See, e.g., supra Part II.B. 1.
212 Human Cloning Prohibition Act, S.1574, 105th Cong. § 3(c) (1998)
(emphasis added).213 Id. § 3(a)(2) (emphasis added).
214 The Campbell Act has at least two other drafting errors. First, the Act's
definition of cloning is grammatically incorrect, leading to a nonsensical
prohibition.
[T]he terms "clone" and "cloning" mean the practice of creating or
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The language of Ehlers's Funding Act also is problematic. Ehlers,
however, recognized some of the semantic shortcomings in his Funding
Act and offered substitute language in the nature of an amendment to the
Science Committee. The Amended Funding Act bans federal funding of
nuclear transplantation cloning using either embryonic or adult human
cells.15 Ehlers amended the Funding Act to make clear his intention to
cover embryonic cloning; however, he did not accomplish his purpose
because the language of the Amended Funding Act does not cover embryo
splitting, a form of cloning.1 6 Embryo splitting does not involve the
transfer of either adult or embryonic cell nuclei into enucleated eggs.217 As
a result, funding bans on nuclear transfer do not cover embryo splitting.
The Bond/Lott Act suffers from the same problem. It defines the
prohibited activity as nuclear transfer, which, by definition, does not apply
to embryo splitting.218 Yet, both Bond and Elders clearly favor bans on
embryonic research. The Bond/Lott Act contains a finding clearly
indicating an intent by the drafters to prohibit research on embryos: "[I]t
is right and proper to prohibit the creation of cloned human embryos that
wouldneverhave the opportunity for implantation and that would therefore
be created solely for research that would ultimately lead to their destruc-
tion. 219
Bond also told reporters that those who favor embryo research" 'would
lead us down the slippery slope that would allow the creation of masses of
human embryos as if they were assembly line products, not human life."',
In commenting on the difference between the Bond/Lott Act and the
Feinstein/Kennedy Act, Ehlers remarked that Feinstein and Kennedy
attempting to create a human being by transferring the nucleus from a
human cell from whatever source into a human egg cell from which the
nucleus has been removed for thepurpose of, or to implant, the resulting
product to initiate a pregnancy that could result in the birth of a human
being.
Id. § 3(c) (emphasis added). Eliminating the words inside the commas leaves the
language, "the purpose of... the resulting product to initiate a pregnancy," which
makes no sense. Second, because the Campbell Act contains two section 3s, the
Act's enforcement section creates penalties for violation of the Act's findings, not
the Act's prohibited activities. See supra notes 199-200.215 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
216 See supra Part I.A. 1.e.
2 7 See supra Part I.A. 1.e.
218 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
19 Human Cloning Prohibition Act, S. 1601, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998).
" Lewis, supra note 186 (quoting Senator Christopher Bond).
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"'want to continue research with embryos and we want to stop it."'"'
Therefore, the question is why both the Bond/Lott Act and Ehlers's
Amended Funding Act do not expressly ban embryo splitting.
One explanation for these legislative oversights is that Bond, Lott, and
Ehlers considered a ban on embryo splitting unnecessary given the current
ban on federal funding for non-therapeutic embryo research.' Since all
forms of cloning research require experimentation on embryos, a federal
funding ban on embryo research amounts to a federal funding ban on all
human cloning research.
This explanation, however, does not account for the Bond/Lott Act,
which bans research involving nuclear transplantation cloning, whether
carried out by public or private entities. 23 The federal funding ban on
embryo research does not extend to persons or entities that do not accept
federal funds. Therefore, the Bond/Lott Act leaves an important, unin-
tended gap in coverage: research involving embryo splitting and creation
ofhuman clones through embryo splitting are not banned, provided federal
funds are not used.
Moreover, it is clear that Ehlers intended to create a funding prohibi-
tion coextensive with current federal bans on embryo research. During the
markup of his Amended Funding Act, Ehlers noted that
the issue of embryo research is a very difficult issue. I decided the best
way out of this was simply to use the language that has been used before
by the Congress, that was passed by the Congress and signed into law by
the President in the annual appropriations bills ofLabor/HHS [Health and
Human Services].Y4
In addition, the AmendedFunding Act defines protected scientific research
as "somatic cell nuclear transfer or other cloning technologies to clone...
221 Vincent Kieman, Debate Over Cloning Touches One of Society's Most
Sensitive Nerves, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 27, 1998, at A16 (quoting Rep.
Vernon J. Ehlers of Michigan).
' In 1994, the National Institutes of Health discontinued funding for non-
therapeutic research on human embryos. See CLONING HUMANBEINGS, supra note
3, at 88-89. In both 1996 and 1997, Congress also banned federal funding to the
Departments of Labor, Education, and Health and Human Services for non-
therapeutic experimentation on human embryos. See id. at 89 (citing Pub. L. No.
104-91 and Pub. L. No. 104-208).
' See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.224 H.R. REP. No. 105-239, at 26 (1997) (statement ofRep. Vern Ehlers during
the markup of the Amended Funding Act in the House Committee on Science).
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cells other than human embryo cells." Using this definition, embryo
splitting, which is a form of cloning technology used to clone human
embryonic cells, does not qualify as protected scientific activity. Yet, the
Amended Funding Act does not ban the use of federal funds for embryo
splitting. Thus, Ehlers did not want to protect research involving embryo
splitting, but that is exactly what his definition of cloning accomplishes.
This is important if Ehlers intends his Cloning Act to ban all forms of
cloning, including research on embryos. Given Ehlers's views on embryo
research, the definition of cloning in his Amended Funding Act is
problematic. The current federal ban on funding for embryo research
partially fills in the gaps left by the Amended Funding Act's definition of
cloning. The federal funding ban, however, would not cover a similar
definitional gap in the Cloning Act because that Act is an outright ban on
both private and public activity, not a withdrawal of federal funds for
certain forms of research.
c. Philosophical Distinctions
Both the CPA and the Feinstein/Kennedy Act only prohibit the use of
nuclear transplantation cloning and only if the product of that cloning is
implanted in a woman's uterus to give birth to the clone. 6 This narrow
prohibition raises two important questions. First, why do the CPA and the
Feinstein/Kennedy Act ban only nuclear transplantation cloning? Second,
why does the prohibition in both Acts apply only to the implantation and
actual creation of a newborn human clone?
Neither the CPA nor the Feinstein/Kennedy Act bans the creation of
human clones accomplished through embryo splitting.? 7 If a scientist
transfers the cell nucleus from a human somatic cell into an enucleated
ovum and implants the resulting clone, he or she would violate the CPA
and the Feinstein/Kennedy Act. If the same scientist "breaks apart" a four-
celled embryo, cultures each of the four totipotent cells, and implants each,
four identical children will be born, but she will not violate the CPA or the
m Id. at 2 (citing H.R. 922, 105th Cong. § 4(1) (1997)) (emphasis added).
'6 The CPA and the Feinstein/Kennedy Act ban the implantation of a clone
created by nuclear transfer technology. The CPA, however, also bans the use of
nuclear transplantation to "in any other way creat[e] a human being." H.R. Doc.
No. 105-97, § 5, at 7 (1997). The CPA, then, seems to address the possibility of
creating human clones outside the human body, e.g., in the laboratory.
' See id.; Prohibition ofCloning ofHuman Beings Act of 1998, S. 1611, 105th
Cong. § 4 (1998).
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Feinstein/Kennedy Act. Therefore, the two Acts ban human cloning only
when certain technology is used, that is, nuclear transplantation cloning.
One explanation for this distinction is that the sponsors of the bills,
unlike the sponsors of the Bond/Lott Act, may have intended to distinguish
between embryo splitting andnucleartransplantation cloning. It is less than
clear, however, why such distinctions would be drawn. The same dan-
gers-negative eugenics, the loss of individuality, and the objectification of
children-result not only from use of individual somatic cells, whether
drawn from adult humans or adult embryos, but also from embryo
splitting 28 The goal of embryo splitting is increasing the efficiency of
assisted reproductive techniques. 9 The couple's interests prevail over any
potential concern about genetic selection of good embryos or about the
individuality of offspringthat are createdthrough artificial twinning. While
differences do exist between nuclear transplantation cloning and embryo
splitting, both raise the specter of negative eugenics and the potential loss
of what President Clinton, in his message accompanying the CPA, calls our
"God-given individuality. 2 30
The second problem with the Feinstein/Kennedy Act and the CPA is
the focus on creation of a human clone. The assumption is that the only
harm involved in cloning is the end result-the birth of a human clone. At
the moment, cloning is considered unsafe,23' yet if Congress allows
research on embryonic and adult cell cloning to continue, scientists may
overcome these safety concerns. The issue, then, is not safety alone. Should
society allow cloning if it is medically safe, i.e., no physical harm to the
clone? Such a narrow definition of harm ignores other important values,
such as the "right to an open future."232 If scientists perfect cloning
techniques to eliminate physical harms, it is likely that fertility specialists
and infertile couples will exert pressure to actually use the technology,
asserting a right of individual choice. "The American attitude is one of
'show me the money, and the technology will become available somehow.'
2 See discussion supra Parts I.A.l.d and I.B.2.
2 See supra note 106.
23on June 9, 1997, President Clinton held a news conference in the Rose
Garden at the White House to announce his transmittal to Congress of the CPA.
President Clinton noted that his legislation would "reaffirm our most cherished
belief about the miracle of human life and the God-given individuality each person
possesses." Remarks AnnouncingtheProposed"Cloning ProhibitionActof 1997,"
33 WKLY. COMP. PREs. Doc. 844, 845 (June 9, 1997).
231 See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 108.
12 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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... [W]e need to give serious thought to whether our laissez-faire market
mechanisms are the best determinants of how children should be brought
into the world. 'u The absence of effective controls on other forms of
reproductive technology has created this "anything goes" mentality, fed by
couples desperate to conceive. At a minimum, the lessons learned from the
excesses of other assisted reproductive technology techniques"4 should
advise caution in crafting underinclusive prohibitions on cloning technol-
ogy.
I. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS
A. Congress's Power to Regulate Commerce"
Congress derives its power to regulate interstate commerce from
Article I of the Constitution, which empowers Congress to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes."'-" The representatives to the Constitutional Convention
did not debate the meaning of the Commerce Clause; hence, no record
exists of its meaning.2" Nevertheless, there is a long history of Supreme
Court case law on the Commerce Clause that addresses the legitimacy of
both the power of Congress and the power of the states to enact legislation
that affects interstate commerce.
Between the adoption of the Constitution and the Civil War, the
Supreme Court did not find any federal commercial legislation to be
constitutionally invalid.'" However, the Court did speak to the issue of
congressional power to regulate interstate commerce during this time. The
most famous case is Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 decided in 1824. Gibbons
originated as an action for injunctive relief by Aaron Ogden, who had been
'Andrews, supra note 103, at B5.
14 See CLONINGHUMANBEINGS, supra note 3, at 98 ("The history of infertility
treatment-especially that of in-vitro fertilization-demonstrates that where there is
a sizeable and well financed demand for a novel service, there will be professionals
willing to provide it.").
11 For a general history of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§
4.1-4.9, at 131-64 (5th ed. 1995).
236 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
237 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 235, § 4.3, at 137.
2' See id. § 4.4, at 13940.239 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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assigned an exclusive right pursuant to New York state law to operate
steamboats on New York waterways.2' ° Ogden sought an injunction to
enforce this right against Thomas Gibbons, who operated two steamboats
between New Jersey and New York pursuant to an act of Congress.241
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme
Court held that the New York law was unconstitutional because it violated
the Supremacy Clause. In the course of his opinion, however, Marshall
established general principles that, to this day, govern in Commerce Clause
adjudication. First, Marshall gave an expansive, rather than a restrictive,
definition of commerce.
The counsel for [Ogden] would limit [commerce] to traffic, to buying and
selling, or the interchange of commodities, and do not admit that. it
comprehends navigation. This would restrict a general term, applicable to
many objects, to one of its significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is
traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the
commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its
branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that
intercourse.242
Defining commerce, however, was not the end of the inquiry for Marshall.
The Commerce Clause provides that Congress may regulate commerce
"among the several States."243 For Marshall, the question was how far
Congress could regulate. In other words, did Congress's power to regulate
interstate commerce stop at a state's boundaries? Marshall answered this
question in the negative: if a commercial transaction begins in interstate
commerce, simply because it ultimately rests within a state's internal
boundaries does not except such commerce from Congress's power.2'
Marshall did, however, recognize that Congress's power to regulate
commerce did not extend to "the exclusively internal commerce of a
State."24 Finally, Marshall stated that the only limitations on congressional
240 See id. at2.
24! See id. (noting that Gibbons responded by asserting that his boats "were duly
enrolled and licensed, to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade, under the
act of Congress, passed the 18th of February, 1793, c. 8, entitled 'An act for
enrolling and licensing ships and vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and
fisheries, and for regulating the same").2421d. at 189-90.
243 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194-96.
2451 d. at 195.
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power to regulate interstate commerce were those provided in the text of
the Constitution itself.'
Marshall's expansive vision of Congress's Commerce Clause powers
governs today, but that has not always been the case.247 During the first 100
years of the nation's history, Congress enacted few commercial laws;
hence, there was little Commerce Clause case law by the Supreme Court.248
In the period between 1888 and 1933, the Tenth Amendment,249 which
reserves to the states those powers not specifically delegated to the federal
government, drove the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause case law."5 As
a result, the Court struck down legislation that interfered with the reserved
powers of the states, unless Congress demonstrated a "direct" connection
to interstate commerce. 5 1
The Supreme Court and the executive branch collided during the 1930s
because the Court invalidated a number of pieces of New Deal
legislation.5'- In early 1937, the Court's willingness to find federal
legislation unconstitutional changed with President Roosevelt's proposal
to "pack" the Court? 3 Although Congress rejected his plan, it had the
desired effect: the Court restrained its inclination to declare acts of
Congress unconstitutional.'
Today, the Supreme Court accords great deference to congressional
statutes enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Over the past sixty
years, the Court rarely has invalidated a piece of federal legislation on the
grounds that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause.
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v.
Lopez, 55 most lawyers and constitutional scholars realized that most
federal legislation, if challenged as violative of the Commerce Clause,
would survive constitutional scrutiny. However, commentators struggled
to articulate a coherent rationale underlying the Supreme Court's Com-
24 See id. at 196.47See NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 235, § 4.4, at 141.
248 See id. § 4.4, at 139.
249 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.").
,10 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 235, § 4A, at 145.
2s' See id.
252 See id. § 4.7, at 151-55.
253 See id. § 4.7, at 154-55.2
- See id. § 4.7, at 155.
1 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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merce Clause case law. 6 The Supreme Court's failure to articulate clear
limitations on congressional authority under the Commerce Clause has
created much confusion, which the Court's decision inLopezhas done little
to eliminate.
Lopez has generated a flurry of scholarly debate. 7 It is unclear how
Lopez will shape the future of federal Commerce Clause litigation, but an
analysis of the opinion suggests that Lopez does not herald a radical shift
in the deference the Court has accorded to federal legislation enacted
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
1. United States v. Lopez28
Lopez involved a challenge to section 922(q) of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990,2s9 which criminalized the possession of"a firearm at a
place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a
school zone."'26 In March of 1992, Lopez, a twelfth grade student, was
arrested and charged with violating section 922(q).261 Lopez sought
256 See Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power
andIncidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez 94 MICH. L. REV. 554,554 (1995)
(arguing that "our post-1937 [Commerce Clause] theory, whether before or after
Lopez, is a mess"); see also John Frantz, Recent Developments, The Reemergence
ofthe Commerce Clause as a Limit on Federal Power: United States v. Lopez, 115
S. Ct. 1624 (1995), 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161, 161 (1995) (footnote
omitted) (noting that the Court "has never articulated a clear standard isolating
those intrastate activities that are valid subjects of congressional control").
" See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce
Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801 (1996) (examining the
effect ofLopez on federal criminal law and on the congressional effort to federalize
crime); Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the
Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 719 (1996) (suggesting that the Court should
'withdraw from review of congressional legislative authority); Regan, supra note
256 (suggesting that the Court should evaluate congressional commerce power
based upon the need for federal action and the inability of the states to address the
problem); Robert Wax, Comment, United States v. Lopez: The Continued
Ambiguity of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 69 TEMPLE L. REv. 275 (1996)
(arguing that the Court both misused precedent and distorted various tests inLopez,
resulting in an ambiguous and inefficient interpretation of the Commerce Clause).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
z Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).2601d. § 922(q)(2)(A).
261 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
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dismissal of the charges on the grounds that Congress lacked the authority
to legislate with regard to local public schools.262 The federal district court
denied the motion and, at the conclusion of a bench trial, sentenced Lopez
to six months in prison. 63 Lopez appealed, andthe Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed his conviction.264 The Fifth Circuit found section
922(q) to be an invalid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause powers.265
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and in a five-to-four decision, the
Court upheld the Fifth Circuit's decision.
Justice Rehnquist began the majority opinion with a briefhistory of the
Supreme Court's decisions on the federal Commerce Clause.266 From those
decisions he gleaned three categories of activities that the Court has found
are permissible areas for federal regulation.
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to
regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.
267
After quickly rejecting the first two possibilities as applicable to
section 922(q), Rehnquist proceeded to analyze the third source of
congressional commerce authority-substantial effect on interstate
commerce.2 6 Rehnquist concluded that the activity proscribed by section
922(q) did not substantially affect interstate commerce based upon three
separate arguments.269
First, he concluded that the possession of a handgun constitutes
criminal, not commercial activity. "Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that
by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
262 See id. at 552.
263 See id.
26 See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
265 See id. at 1367-68.266 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-59.
267 Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
268 See id. at 559.
269See id. at 560-63.
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enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms." '27 Second, he
found that the statute did not require proof that the possession of the
firearm had "an explicit connection with or effect on interstate
commerce. 271 Finally, Rehnquist admitted that Congress normally does not
need to make findings as to the burdens a proscribed activity has on
interstate commerce . 2  However, he noted that where the impact of an
activity on interstate commerce is not "visible to the naked eye,"'2n the
absence of such findings makes it more difficult for the Court to make the
connection to interstate commerce.
Justices Thomas and Kennedy wrote concurring opinions,274 but it is
Justice Kennedy's opinion that suggests that Lopez is not a radical
departure from prior Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence. As
did Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy identified the proscribed behavior
in Lopez as noncommercial and without an "evident commercial nexus."275
In addition, he found that section 922(q) intruded into an area traditionally
considered to be within the realm of state control-education.276 However,
Justice Kennedy cautioned against a return to an earlier conception of
commerce that worked in the eighteenth century, but which would fail if
used in today's national, unified market.
[T]he Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole have an
immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as
270 Id. at 561 (footnote omitted). One commentator has criticized Rehnquist's
reading of the Commerce Clause for requiring the prohibited activity to be
commercial in nature.
But even if the leading cases involve commercial behavior, they do not
rely on Justice Rehnquist's commercial-noncommercial distinction .... The
focus is on effects on commerce, not on the commercial nature of the
behavior regulated. So Justice Rehnquist's suggestion, while not
inconsistent with the existing cases, is a highly tendentious gloss on them.
Regan, supra note 256, at 564 (footnote omitted).
271 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. Rehnquist relied upon United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336 (1971), in which the Supreme Court overturned a conviction for firearm
possession because the federal government had failed" 'to show the requisite nexus
with interstate commerce."' Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (quoting Bass, 404 U.S. at
347).
272 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
27 1 d. at 563.
274 See id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
275 Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
276 See id. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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it has evolved to this point. Stare decisis operates with great force in
counseling us not to call in question the essential principles now in place
respecting the congressional power to regulate transactions of a commer-
cial nature. That fundamental restraint on our power forecloses us from
reverting to an understanding of commerce that would serve only an 18th-
century economy... ; it also mandates against returning to the time when
congressional authority to regulate undoubted commercial activities was
limited by ajudicial determination that those matters had an insufficient
connection to an interstate system. Congress can regulate in the commer-
cial sphere on the assumption that we have a single market and a unified
purpose to build a stable national economy.277
This hesitation to revisit Commerce Clause history, when coupledwith the
four dissenting votes cast in Lopez,278 makes it unlikely that the decision
heralds a new era in Commerce Clause litigation.
2. Will Federal Cloning Legislation
Survive Scrutiny under Lopez?
Despite the confusion surrounding Lopez, the decision appears to
impose no impediment to passage of the CPA, the Feinstein/Kennedy Act,
or the Bond/Lott Act. First, human cloning research is not a purely
intrastate activity.2 9 The difficulty that the Supreme Court encountered in
Lopez was in concluding that an intrastate activity-possession of a
firearm-substantially affected interstate commerce. The Supreme Court
developed the "affecting commerce" test "to define the extent of
Congress's power over purely intrastate commercial activities that
nonetheless have substantial interstate effects." 280 As a result of Lopez,
Congress may regulate the movement of persons or goods across state lines
without demonstrating a substantial impact on interstate commerce.281
Thus, the "affecting commerce" test only comes into play when Congress
2
"Id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
278 Justices Stevens, Souter, andBreyer eachwrote separate dissenting opinions.
See id. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 615
(Breyer, J., dissenting). In addition, Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined
in Justice Breyer's dissent. See id. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
279 See infra notes 290-98 and accompanying text.
11 United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669, 671 (1995) (per curiam) (citation
omitted).
"' See Regan, supra note 256, at 560 (footnote omitted) ("Congress may
prohibit the movement across state lines of anything it pleases.").
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regulates intrastate, noncommercial activity with a questionable commer-
cial impact.
But cloning is clearly a commercial activity. Treating infertility is big
business. Each cycle of in vitro fertilization ("IVF") can cost between
$5000 to $10,000.22 Because IVF is inefficient,283 it may cost a couple
anywhere from $40,000 to $200,000 to have a child using IVF
technology.2 4 Other costs, such as the rapidly increasing price of donor
eggs, may add to the basic fees for IVF.
Cloning may increase the efficiency of IVF. At present, a woman
undergoing IVF must take hormones in order to stimulate her ovaries to
produce multiple eggs per menstrual cycle. Cloning eliminates the need for
ovarian stimulation. One egg can be fertilized outside the body and divided
in half through embryo splitting, resulting in identical embryos for
implantation.26 Alternatively, the nuclei from the cells of one embryo may
be inserted into donor eggs, resulting in multiple clones of one fertilized
ovum. These services, which potentially increase the efficiency of IVF and
decrease the risks involved for the woman, could create a whole new
market for fertility experts to exploit.
Moreover, the experiments that led to Dolly's birth clearly reveal the
commercial implications and nature of cloning. PPL Therapeutics ("PPL"),
a pharmaceutical company working to find more efficient methods to
produce human drugs, helped finance the cloning research of Dr. Wilmut
and Dr. Campbell.287 After the announcement of Dolly's birth, the price of
PPL's stock increased by sixty-seven percent.288 PPL also has filed for a
patent on the cloning technology that resulted in Dolly's birth.89
282 See Anne M. Lawton & Lynda J. Oswald, Teaching the Doctrine of
Precedent Through Simulations, 13 J. LEGALSTUDIEsEDUC. 121,132 n.15(1995).283 The success rate, measured by the number of live births for each cycle of egg
retrieval and implantation, is approximately 19%. See Ethical Considerations,
supra note 25, at 38S.
284 See SILVER, supra note 24, at 69.
" As women age, the probability of becoming pregnant decreases. Thus, some
women may choose to use eggs donated by younger women in order to become
pregnant. See Lisa Belkin, Pregnant with Complications, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct.
26, 1997, at 35. The price of donor eggs for in vitro fertilization recently made the
news when a New Jersey fertility clinic offered to pay $5000 for a month's supply
of eggs. See Gina Kolata, Price of Donor Eggs Soars, Setting Off a Debate on
Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1998, at Al.286 See supra note 106.
7 See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 213.
28 See Dolly Makes PPL 's Shares Soar, AGBIOTECH NEWS & INFo., May 1997
(visited Oct. 28, 1998) <http://www.cabi.org/whatsnew/cloneani.htm#10>.
"I See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 220.
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Furthermore, cloning research and the facilities that conduct such
research do not involve small, intrastate activities. First, research facilities
that conduct cloning need scientists. It is unlikely that such facilities would
advertise solely within the state in which the facility is located, especially
given the scientific training and knowledge required.2" Research also
progresses through the sharing of information. Scientists at one facility
may communicate with those at facilities in other states, sharing informa-
tion or even working on collaborative research projects. Second, research
institutions cost substantial amounts of money to operate. Without federal
funds, these facilities will look to the private sector. It is unlikely that the
funding for such facilities will be limited to intrastate sources, and the
money certainlywill be available. The federal government stopped funding
IVF research more than twenty years ago, yet clinics performing IVF have
thrived.291
Finally, existing reproductive facilities draw patients from outside the
states in which they operate. The Feinstein/Kennedy Act recognizes the
interstate character of reproductive services such as cloning. The Act's
findings2 92 provide that "patients travel regularly across State lines in order
to access reproductive services facilities." 293 The travel involved in
obtaining assisted reproductive services means that not only the patients,
but also the "products of biomedical research2 94 will move in interstate
commerce. This is exactly what happened in York v. Jones.295 In that case,
the Yorks, who were residents of New Jersey, underwent in vitro fertiliza-
tion at a clinic in Virginia.296 When the Yorks moved to California, they
2 1 See SILVER, supra note 24, at 69-70.
291 See Andrews, supra note 103, at B4.
292 Congress ordinarily need not make findings about the effect of a regulated
activity on interstate commerce. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304
(1964) (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)).
This is especially true in a case involving direct movement of persons and goods
across state lines, as opposed to a case involving intrastate activity having a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 563 (1995) ('But to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to
evaluate the legislativejudgment that the activity in question substantially affected
interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the
naked eye, they are lacking here.").
293 Prohibitionon Cloning offHuman Beings Act of 1998, S.1611, 105th Cong.
§ 2(13)(C) (1998).
2M Id. § 2(13)(B).
295 York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
296See id. at 423.
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sued the Virginia clinic, seeking release of one remaining cryopreserved
embryo.297 Although York did not involve cloning, it demonstrates the
interstate nature of such "reproductive services. 29
Even if the courts conclude that cloning is an intrastate activity, it
differs substantially from the activity that Congress attempted to regulate
in Lopez. The Bond/Lott Act provides for criminal penalties, as did section
922(q) of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, and the CPA and
Feinstein/Kennedy Act provide stiff monetary penalties for violations.21
However, none of the federal cloning bills penalizes an activity that can be
described as noncommercial in nature. Section 922(q) penalized the mere
possession of a firearm.3" The federal anti-cloning bills make unlawful an
activity with significant commercial ramifications. Embryonic cloning
already has a ready market-infertile couples who would use such cloning
in order to increase their chances of bearing a child with their genetic
imprint.301
More importantly, the reasons expressed in Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Lopez simply do not apply with equal force to prohibitions
on cloning. To begin with, it is not clear that the regulation of medical and
scientific research is a subject traditionally reserved to the states, as is
education. Moreover, given the overlap between state and federal
regulation, how clearly can traditional areas of state concern be delineated?
The Court made another attempt, not twenty years ago, to exploit the
concept of areas of traditional state concern, and it gave up the attempt
only nine years later because of the indeterminateness of that concept....
[E]ven if we accept for purposes of argument that there are recognizable
areas of traditional state concern, in which the Court should be specially
solicitous to protect a proper balance of federal and state power, that tells
us nothing about how to identify the proper balance, or to know when it
is destroyed. Justice Kennedy gives us little indication of how to answer
what is, on his formulation, the central question.302
297 See id. at 422.
298 It is not clear that cloning is a form of reproduction, as opposed to repli-
cation. But the analogy to assisted reproductive technologies is appropriate,
considering the fact that embryo cloning has been proposed as an efficient way to
solve certainproblems associated with in vitro fertilization. See Fackelmann, supra
note 47, at 276.
299 See supra notes 141-42, 179, 188 and accompanying text.31 See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
301 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
302Regan, supra note 256, at 566 (footnotes omitted).
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Even if regulation of medical and scientific discovery falls within the
traditional purview of state regulatory power, however, the Court would
only reach that issue if it determined that cloning was not a commercial
activity. Justice Kennedy objected to the reach of section 922(q) because
it not only involved what he concluded was a noncommercial activity, but
also intruded into an area traditionally reserved to the states. 303
Justice Kennedy also believed it was important to allow the states to
experiment with solutions to the problem of guns in the schools. He argued
that if "considerable disagreement exists about how to best accomplish [a]
goal.., the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States
may perform theirrole as laboratories for experimentation to devise various
solutions." 3°' Violence in the schools, however, is a far different problem
than cloning. The complexity of the scientific, legal, and ethical issues
involved in cloning suggests that a federal response might be appropriate.
President Clinton already has directed the NBAC to study the issue. °5
Thus, a qualified panel of experts exists to examine the problems involved
and to make coherent recommendations on how to approach the legal and
ethical issues.
In addition, the costs of nonuniform regulation must be weighed
against the benefits of allowing states to experiment with what forms of
cloning they wish to permit. After all, attempting to regulate after the first
human clone is created is akin to closing the barn door after letting the
horse out. If Congress cannot ban cloning, then the task of regulation falls
to the states. The problem, however, is that not all states will ban cloning.
Some may ban only certain forms of cloning. 06 This means that as
scientific discovery progresses, enterprising individuals will establish
cloning facilities in those states with the most favorable legislation, and
forum shopping may result. Allowing each state to define what forms of
cloning it will permit means an increased risk that scientists and private
companies will seek out states with less restrictive laws in order to continue
unregulated scientific experimentation on cloning. The overriding purpose
of federal cloning legislation is to stop research into cloning until there is
abetterunderstanding of the dangers associatedwith the technology. 07 The
303 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580-81 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
3oId. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
3o5 See supra Part II.A.
31 See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text
30 See Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act of 1998, S.1611, 105th
Cong. § 2 (1998).
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proposed federal legislation is meant to stop a problem before it starts, not
curtail an existing problem such as students bringing handguns to school.
Therefore, state experimentation in the area of cloning is not an acceptable
strategy.
IV. CLONING AND REPRODUCTIVE LIBERTY
In a long line of cases dating back to the 1923 case of Meyer v.
Nebraska,°8 the Supreme Court has used a fundamental rights analysis to
constitutionally protect certain personal decisions related to procreation,
pregnancy, child-rearing, and marital relationships. The Court's fundamen-
tal rights jurisprudence holds that although such rights are not expressly
recognized in the Constitution's text, they are subsumed within the notion
of liberty in the Due Process Clause.
Although "[tjhe Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of
privacy," the Court has recognized that one aspect of the "liberty"
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is "a
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).... While the outer
limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by the Court, it is
clear that among the decisions that an individual may make without
unjustified government interference are personal decisions "relating to
marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942); contra-
ception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S., at 453-454; id., at 460, 463-465
(WHITE, J., concurring in result); family relationships, Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); and child rearing and education,
Pierce v. Society ofSisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
[262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)]." Roe v. Wade, supra, at 152-153.
The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very
heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices .... This is
understandable, for in a field that by definition concerns the most intimate
of human activities and relationships, decisions whether to accomplish or
to prevent conception are among the most private and sensitive.0 9
308 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
309 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (citation
omitted); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-51 (1992)
(reaffirming Roe's protection of a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy).
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Once the Court labels a right as fundamental, the strict scrutiny test is
invoked to evaluate the challenged government action. °10 The difficulty in
administering the fundamental rights analysis lies in determining exactly
what constitutes a fundamental right. The Court has recognized as
fundamental those rights "that are 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were
sacrificed.""'31 The Court also has used a historical test, ranking as
fundamental those rights that are "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition.' "312
The Court appears to apply both tests in making the fundamental rights
analysis.313 The historical test provides some constraints on judicial
decision making; however, it leaves little room for constitutional growth
and potentially cements the Constitution in time. The ordered liberty test
makes the Constitution a "living document," but it opens up the Court to
charges that it merely is substituting its notions of a "good society" for
those of the legislature.314
310 In Casey, however, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter devised the
undue burden standard to measure the constitutionality of several abortion
restrictions in the PennsylvaniaAbortion Control Act of 1982. See Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 874. Only those three Justices signed onto this portion of the Court's opinion,
so the strict scrutiny test still applies to cases involving fundamental rights. "[T]he
"undue burden" standard... is created largely out of whole cloth by [Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter]. It is a standard which even today does not
command the support of a majority of this Court." Id. at 964 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
311 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
312 Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(opinion of Powell, J.)).
313 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
314 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 513 n.5 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
"[J]udges are seldom content merely to annul the particular solution before
them; they do not, indeed they may not, say that taking all things into
consideration, the legislators' solution is too strong for the judicial stomach.
On the contrary they wrap up their veto in a protective veil of adjectives
such as 'arbitrary,' 'artificial,' 'normal,' 'reasonable,' 'inherent,'
'fundamental,' or'essential,' whose office usually, though quite innocently,
is to disguise what they are doing and impute to it a derivation far more
impressive than their personal preferences, which are all that in fact lie
behind the decision."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70 (1958)).
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What is clear is that neither test offers a useful standard for measuring
those rights deemed by the Court to be fundamental. "The basis upon
which the Court declares an aspect of liberty to be a fundamental constitu-
tional right remains vague today."315 This makes predictions about the
Court's analysis of anti-cloning legislation difficult. Nonetheless, based on
recent decisions by the Court involving questions of individual liberty, it
appears unlikely that the Court will recognize the right to clone as
fundamental.
First, the Court likely will frame the issue narrowly, as it did in Bowers
v. Hardwick3 6 and Washington v. Glucksberg.3'7 Framing the question as
the right to use cloning, as opposed to the right to control procreative
choices, guarantees that cloning will fail the historical test for fundamental
rights. Second, although the Supreme Court reaffirmed the central holding
of Roe v. Wade18 in PlannedParenthood v. Casey,319 it did so in a fractious
and fractured decision. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, in their
joint opinion, intimated that they would have ruled differently in Roe.320
Cloning raises many ethical issues relatedto the abortion debate. Given the
Court's discomfort with Roe, it is highly unlikely that it will overturn anti-
cloning legislation that was adopted, in part, to protect against embryonic
research.
A. The Right to Clone or the Right to Control Procreation?
1. Framing the Issue:
The Debate over Substantive Due Process
If Congress enacts anti-cloning legislation, any challenge to that
legislation will play out against the backdrop of the Supreme Court's
continuing debate over the legitimacy of substantive due process. 31 In the
3 5 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 235, § 11.7, at 404.
316 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (framing the issue not in
terms of the fundamental right of privacy, but rather as "whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy").
317 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,2269 (1997) (framing the issue
not in terms of the fundamental right of privacy, butrather as "whether the 'liberty'
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes arightto commit suicide").
311 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
311 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).320 See infra notes 409-10 and accompanying text.
321 Substantive due process generally requires that legislation be "fair and
reasonable in content as well as application." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1429 (6th
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early part of this century, substantive due process acquired a black eye. The
Court used the doctrine to protect the free market from unnecessary
government intrusions.3" The Court's "review of legislation during this
period resulted in an unprincipled control of social and economic
legislation. '323 As the Court continued to apply substantive due process to
strike down much of the New Deal economic legislation, President
Roosevelt responded with his infamous Court-packing plan.324 Congress
ultimately rejectedRoosevelt's plan, but not before it had the desired effect
of dissuading the Court from using substantive due process to review and
reject New Deal economic legislation.325 In 1937, in West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish,326 the Court retreated from its commitment to substantive due
process review of economic legislation, signaling the end of an era.327
However, substantive due process reemerged in the early 1960s as the
Supreme Court began to review state legislation infringing on what the'
Court called fundamental rights and liberties. In Griswoldv. Connecticut,38
the Court held that a Connecticut statute that penalized both the use of
contraceptives and the dissemination of information or advice about
contraceptive use was unconstitutional.329 Justice Douglas, speaking for the
majority, stated that he was not using substantive due process to review the
constitutionality of the Connecticut law.330 Nonetheless, his analysis
arguably amounted to a substantive review of the fairness of the Connecti-
cut law, albeit disguised as a case involving the penumbras of the First
Amendment. 331 Douglas favorably cited Meyer v. Nebraska332 and Pierce
ed. 1990).
322 See NOWAK &ROTUNDA, supra note 235, § 11.4, at 384.323 Id. § 11.4, at 384-85 (footnote omitted).
324 See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
321 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 235, § 11.3, at 3 80-81.
326 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
327 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 235, § 11.4, at 386.
3' Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).329 See id. at 485-86.
331See id. at 482 ('We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom,
need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or
social conditions.").
331 See id. at 482-83.
332 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Meyer involved a challenge to a
Nebraska statute that made it unlawful to "'teach any subject to any person in any
language other than the English language."' Id. at 397. The Supreme Court
concluded that the statute violated the parents' liberty interest in controlling their
children's education, as well as the teacher's liberty interest in pursuing his chosen
vocation. See id. at 400-01.
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v. Society of Sisters333 as support for his proposition that the Constitution
extended protection to rights found within its penumbras. 34 Yet, both
Meyer and Pierce were substantive due process cases, in which the Court
granted fundamental rights status to the ability of parents to control their
children's education. As Justice Black noted in his dissent in Griswold,
"the reasoning stated in Meyer and Pierce was the same natural law due
process philosophy which many later opinions repudiated, and which I
cannot accept." 335
Notwithstanding Justice Black's objections to the application of
substantive due process to social legislation, in various cases since
Griswold, the Supreme Court has evaluated the substantive fairness of state
statutes that prohibited abortion,336 required court approval prior to
marriage forpersons delinquent in child support,337 criminalized consensual
homosexual activity,338 and restricted the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment.3 39 Several Justices have expressed concern about applying
substantive due process because of the possibility that the Court may
mistakenly impose personal values rather than undertake a constitutional
analysis.
When the Court ventures further and defines as "fundamental" liberties
that are nowhere mentioned in the Constitution (or that are present only
in the so-called "penumbras" of specifically enumerated rights), it must,
of necessity, act with more caution, lest it open itself to the accusation
that, in the name of identifying constitutional principles to which the
people have consented in framing their Constitution, the Court has done
nothing more than impose its own controversial choices of value upon the
people.3 40
33 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Pierce, the Society of
Sisters, which operated Roman Catholic schools, challenged an Oregon statute
requiring students from ages 8 to 16 to attend public schools. The Supreme Court
found the statute unconstitutional, concluding it"unreasonably interfere[d] with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control." Id. at 534-35.334 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-83.
335 Id. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting).
336 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
337 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).338 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).339 See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).340Thomburghv. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747,790 (1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruledby Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992). Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in White's dissent in
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The continuing debate over the use of substantive due process and the
parameters of that doctrine shape constitutional analysis involving
fundamental rights. The manner in which a Justice frames the legal issue
in a case provides some evidence of the Justice's comfort level with the
doctrine of substantive due process. How the issue is framed, in turn,
affects the outcome of the case. Nowhere is this more evident than in the
Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick."1
In Bowers, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a
Georgia statute that made consensual sodomy a criminal offense. 2
Hardwick, the criminal defendant, had been arrested for engaging in
sodomy in his own home with another man. In a five-to-four decision, the
Court found that the statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.3
The majority opinion, authored by Justice White, framed the issue as
"whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy."3' The majority then set forth the
standards traditionally used by the Court to determine what constitutes a
fundamental right. First, fundamental rights include those "liberties that are
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor
justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.' 345 Second, those liberties
that are "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"' are also
protected as fundamental rights.3 6
In enunciating the Supreme Court's standards for determining the
existence of a fundamental right, the majority appeared to question the
legitimacy of the Court's traditional approach.
Striving to assure itself and the public that announcing rights not
readily identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much more than the
imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the States and the
Federal Government, the Court has sought to identify the nature of the
rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection.347
This language certainly does not suggest a wholehearted endorsement of
the Court's substantive due process analysis. Nevertheless, the majority did
Thornburgh.
341 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
342 See id. at 188 n.1 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)).
343 See id. at 196.
344 Id. at 190.
345 Id. at 191-92.
34 6 Id. at 192 (citations omitted).347Id. at 191.
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not expressly renounce the Court's standards for substantive due process
review, because it easily concluded that the "right [of] homosexuals to
engage in sodomy 348 satisfied neither of the Court's tests for fundamental
rights. "It is obvious to us that neither of these formulations would extend
a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual
sodomy. Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots. 349
The majority in Bowers, however, treated the two categories of
fundamental rights as if they were one. Historical evidence showing the
prevalence of anti-sodomy laws worked not only to demonstrate that the
right to engage in consensual sodomy was not deeply rooted in national
history, but also to show that the right was not subsumed within the concept
of ordered liberty. 30 If the Court's formulation of fundamental rights
includes those rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"351
then ordered liberty must mean something different than those rights that
are deeply rooted in national history. Otherwise, it is unnecessary to use the
ordered liberty test in determining fundamental rights.
By collapsing the ordered liberty test into the historical test and by
formulating the issue narrowly, the majority in Bowers guaranteed that it
would not recognize as fundamental the right to engage in homosexual
sodomy. After all, according to the historical analysis in Bowers, the right
to engage in homosexual activity has never been recognized in the United
States. But many states have penalized other activities, such as miscegena-
tion, that the Supreme Court has found to be constitutionally invalid.352 The
question is why the Court reached a different result in Bowers v. Hardwick.
The answer lies, in part, with the discomfort that some Justices
experience in substantively reviewing legislation. Ifa right is fundamental,
then the Court must apply strict scrutiny.353 That, in turn, means that the
Court most likely will strike the legislation down as unconstitutional. The
Court, however, avoids this dilemma by not recognizing a right as
348 Id. at 190.
9 Id. at 192 (citation omitted).350 See id. at 192-94.
351 Id. at 191.
352See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In his dissent inBowers v. Hardwick,
Justice Stevens noted that "miscegenation was once treated as a crime similar to
sodomy." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).353See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College ofObstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 789 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (stating "[o]nly 'fundamental'
rights are entitled to the added protection provided by strict judicial scrutiny")
(citations omitted), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
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fundamental. It is clear that the majority's uneasiness with substantive due
process drove the result in Bowers.
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority
to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause.
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution. That this is so was
painfully demonstrated by the face-off between the Executive and the
Court in the 1930's, which resulted in the repudiation of much of the
substantive gloss that the Court had placed on the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. There should be, therefore, great
resistance to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly
if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamen-
tal. 354
This exegesis on the dangers of substantive due process followed on the
heels of the majority's rejection of the right to engage in homosexual
sodomy as a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. 55
Had the majority in Bowers defined the issue as whether a state may
interfere with an individual's choice of how to conduct himself in his
intimate relationships, the Court may have reached a different result. The
dissenting opinion made this clear.
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy," as the Court purports to declare, ante, at 191, than
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), was about a fundamental right
to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
was about a fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone
booth. Rather, this case is about "the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men," namely, the "right to be let
alone." 356
As the dissenters aptly noted, the Georgia statute at issue in Bowers v.
Hardwick penalized sodomy, not just homosexual sodomy. 57 Yet, the
4 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95.
355 See id. at 192-94.
356 Id. at 199 (Blaclkmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
357See id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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majority framed the issue in terms of homosexual activity, not consensual
sodomy."' The dissenters argued that the real issue in the case involved the
values underlying the right of privacy. If the state could invade the
bedroom of a homosexual man, then what prevented the state from doing
so to penalize heterosexual sodomy? The dissenters claimed that the right
to personal privacy extended to certain individual decisions, as well as to
particular private places. 9 In Hardwick's case, the state not only intruded
into decisions about his private sexual activity, it did so within the confines
of his home. Thus, forthe dissent, the real danger in the Bowers holding lay
in "depriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves how to
conduct their intimate relationships [which] poses a far greater threat to the
values most deeply rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of
nonconformity could ever do.' 3 °
The debate over substantive due process continues unabated. On the
current Court, Justice Scalia is perhaps the most vocal critic of the dangers
of substantive due process review. As a result, he holds a restrictive view
of those rights deemed to be fundamental. In his concurring opinion in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department ofHealth,36' he wrote separately
to explain his view that the right to commit suicide is not fundamental. As
aresult, it was "unnecessary to reopen the historically recurrent debate over
whether 'due process' includes substantive restrictions." '362 In Scalia's
dissenting opinion in Casey, he attacked the use of substantive due process
to reaffirm Roe. Labeling the plurality's rationales as a meaningless
"parade of adjectives," 363 Justice Scalia concluded that the decision in
Casey resulted not from "reasoned judgment," 36' the hallmark of substan-
358 See id. at 192.
359 See id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
360 d. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
361 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Cruzan is
known as the "right to die" case. The issue in Cruzan was whether the parents of
Nancy Cruzan, who was in a permanent vegetative state, could authorize the
withdrawal of life-sustaining food and water. See id. at 269. The Court assumed
that the Constitution protected the right of competent persons to refuse life-
sustaining food and water; however, it concluded that Missouri could require clear
and convincing evidence of Nancy Cruzan's wish to discontinue food and water
before allowing this action, a burden which had not been met. See id. at 282-85.362 Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
363 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 983 n.2 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3  Id. at 982-84 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The term
"reasoned judgment" refers to Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Poe v. Ullman,
[VOL. 87
THE FRANKENSTEIN CONTROVERSY
tive due process review, but from "personal predilection '36 alone. Justice
Scalia's dissent in Casey captures the persistent concern about substantive
due process: the Court, in evaluating the substantive fairness of legislation,
will impose its own values, rather than adhering to constitutional princi-
ples.
Justice Scalia is not alone in his views. Chief Justice Rehnquist,36
Justice Thomas, and Justice White joined in Justice Scalia's dissent in
Casey.367 In Thornburgh v. American College ofObstetricians & Gynecolo-
gists, 368 a case involving challenges to a Pennsylvania statute imposing
certain restrictions on abortion, then Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice
White's dissenting opinion.3 69 Justice White expressed concern, once again,
about the Court wandering too far afield in its substantive due process case
law.370 Chief Justice Rehnquist also formedpart of the five-person majority
in Bowers that narrowly defined the interest at stake as the right to engage
in homosexual sodomy.37'
In its recent decision in Washington v. Gluckberg,372 the Court
revisited the issue of substantive due process. Chief Justice Rehnquist
authored the Court's opinion, in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomasjoined. Glucksberginvolvedadue process challenge
to a Washington statute that made it illegal to assist a person in committing
suicide.37 The Court began its analysis of the statute by recognizing that
the term "liberty" in the Due Process Clause has a substantive
component. 374 Nonetheless, the Court cautioned that "extending constitu-
tional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest,... place[s] the
367 U.S. 497, 542-544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36s Casey, 505 U.S. at 984 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
366 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate dissent in Casey, in which Justices
White, Scalia and Thomas also joined. See id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).367 See id. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36 Thomburghv. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).369 See id. at 785 (White, J., dissenting).
370 See id. at 790 (White, J., dissenting) ('When the Court ventures further and
defines as 'fundamental' liberties that are nowhere mentioned in the Constitution
it must, of necessity, act with more caution[.]").
371 See supra notes 344-52 and accompanying text.31 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
373 See id. at 2261 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1) (1994)).374See id. at 2267.
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matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action."'375 In order
to protect against such an eventuality, the Court added a requirement to the
traditional test for fundamental rights. In addition to asking whether a
liberty interest is deeply rooted in national traditions or implicit in ordered
liberty, the Court also must "'careful[ly] descri[be]' . . . the asserted
fundamental liberty interest. 37
6
However, a careful description may amount to an attempt to evade
substantive review of legislative choices. This is what the majority did in
Bowers by narrowly defining the interest at stake. Similarly, in Glucksberg,
the Court defined the interest not as "the right to die with dignity," as
suggested by Justice Breyer in his concurrence, 377 but rather as the "right
to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing So.
'371
Framing the issue in this manner, once again, guaranteed that the Court
would find no fundamental right. Historically, assisted suicide has been a
crime, and in most jurisdictions, it continues to carry criminal penalties.379
However, as Justice Breyer noted, "our legal tradition [might] provide
greater support" for the "right to die with dignity" than the "right to
commit suicide with another's assistance." 380
The debate over substantive due process has not ended. As challenges
to federal and state cloning legislation begin, the Court will once again
have to venture into the thorny thicket of its substantive due process case
law. Clearly, the way in which the Court frames the issue will shape the
result.
2. The Abortion Debate
Any analysis of cloning legislation requires an examination of the
Court's abortion decisions. Both embryo splitting and nuclear transplanta-
tion cloning, whether involving human embryonic or adult cells, involve
research on and manipulation of human embryos. In fact, a critical
375 Id. at 2267-68.
376 Id. at 2268.
3771d. at2311 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer concurred inthejudgment
in Glucksberg because the challenged statute did not force dying patients to sustain
"severe physical pain (connected with death), [which] would have to comprise an
essential part of any successful claim" based upon a fundamental right argument.
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
378 Id. at 2269 (footnote omitted).
379 See id. at 2262-67.380Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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difference between the CPA and the Feinstein/Kennedy Act, on the one
hand, and the Bond/Lott Act, on the other, is the prohibition on research
involving embryos."' As a result, the Court's pronouncements on abortion
will figure prominently in the evaluation of any anti-cloning legislation.
a. The Road to Casey
In 1973, in a seven-to-two opinion, the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade"8 2 struck down as unconstitutional a Texas statute that made it a
crime to obtain an abortion. The Court did so on the basis of a right to
privacy grounded in the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.33 Noting that "privacy" is nowhere mentioned in
the Constitution, the majority explained that the Constitution nonetheless
"guarantee[s] ... certain areas or zones of privacy,"384 but only with regard
to those "personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.' ,,385 Drawing on a line of cases recognizing
the fundamental right of parents to control the rearing and education of
their children,38 6 the right to procreation,387 and the right of married388 or
single persons3 9 to use contraceptives, the Court found that "the right of
personal privacy includes the abortion decision."3' By granting the
decision to have an abortion the status of a fundamental right, the Court
required states to demonstrate that their statutory restrictions on abortion
"I See supra Part ll.B.2.3 2 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
383 See id. at 153.
384 Id. at 152.
3 15 Id. (citation omitted).
36 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923); supra notes 332-33.
387 SeeSkinnerv. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Skinner involved a challenge
to an Oklahoma statute that mandated sterilization for those persons who had been
convicted of two or more "felonies involving moral turpitude." Id. at 536. The
Court held the statute to be unconstitutional, finding that "[m]arriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id. at
541.
388 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
... See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.") (citations omitted).
39°Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
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satisfy the strict scrutiny test.39' Because the Court concluded, however,
that the unborn did not fall within the term "'person' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 392 the state's interest in the potential life of the
fetus did not outweigh the woman's liberty interest in deciding whether to
have an abortion.393 Nonetheless, the Court rejected the argument that a
woman has an absolute right to an abortion. Instead, it adopted the
controversial trimester approach, finding that the state's dual interests in
maternal health and the potential life of the fetus become compelling at the
end of the first trimester for maternal health and at the point of viability for
fetal life.394
Roe certainly did not resolve the debate over abortion. On the contrary,
the debate intensified. In the years following Roe, the Supreme Court has
addressed a number of state statutes that place restrictions on the decision
to have an abortion. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,395 the Court
addressed questions that were left unanswered by its decision in Roe about
the proper scope of state legislation restricting the right to abortion. In
Danforth, the Court found unconstitutional several provisions ofaMissouri
statute that required, among other things, married women and minors to
obtain written spousal consent and written parental consent, respectively,
for abortions conducted in the first trimester.396 A year later, in Maher v.
Roe,3 97 in a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court upheld a Connecticut
Welfare Department regulation that restricted the use of Medicaid funds to
only those abortions deemed to be medically necessary, concluding that a
state need not "show a compelling interest for its policy choice to favor
normal childbirth."398
In 1988, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,39 9 the Supreme
Court passed on the constitutionality of a Missouri statute placing
restrictions on the right to procure an abortion. In the thirteen years since
its decision in Danforth, however, the Court's composition had changed.
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy had replaced Justice Stewart,
Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Powell, respectively. The replacement of
391 See id. at 155.
392 Id. at 158.
393 See id. at 162-63.
394 See id.
391 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
396 See id. at 67-75.
397 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
398 rd. at 477.
399 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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Justices Stewart and Powell, who had joined the majority's opinion in
Danforth, affected the outcome in Webster. In an opinion authored by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court in Webster upheld a statutory prohibi-
tion on the use of public facilities to conduct abortions.O More. important
to any analysis of anti-cloning legislation was the Court's treatment of the
preamble to Missouri's statute, which stated that" ' [t]he life of each human
being begins at conception."4 The Court did not rule on whether the
preamble violated the Constitution because it determined that the
preamble's language did not interfere with the decision to obtain an
abortion.4°2 "Certainly the preamble does not by its terms regulate abortion
.... The Court has emphasized that Roe v. Wade 'implies no limitation on
the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion.' The preamble can be read simply to express that sort of value
judgment.'"' 3
The Court is correct that the preamble to Missouri's statute did not
actually affect a woman's right to have an abortion. As a legal matter, Roe
provides that the fetus is not a "person" for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' Of course, that does not mean that the fetus is not a
"person" for purposes of state law. However, "offer[ing] protections to
unborn children in tort and probate law 405 is not the same as stating that
life begins at conception. For example, the traditional rule in tort law only
allowed recovery for wrongful death of a viable fetus.4°6 This rule is
consistent with Roe's trimester analysis and the recognition that the state's
interest in fetal life becomes compelling at viability. Webster's language,
however, opened the door to states according protections in tort law to
nonviable fetuses. The problem is that while distinctions between the rights
of the unborn under federal versus state law maybe legally consistent, they
are philosophically inconsistent. To the average person, such distinctions
mean that the fetus is not a person when a woman wishes to have an
abortion, but may be a person if a woman loses the fetus due to some third
party's negligent act.
40" See id. at 521-22.
411 Id. at 504 (citation omitted).
402 See id. at 506.
"
3 Id. (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
4o See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
405 Webster, 492 U.S. at 506.
406 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 55, at367-70 (5th ed. 1984); William J. Maledon, Note, TheLawandthe Unborn
Child: The Legal andLogical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTREDAME LAW. 349,354-61
(1971).
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At a minimum, the majority's ruling in Websterregarding the language
of the Missouri preamble reveals an uneasiness with the decision in Roe.
Even though a plurality of the Court reaffirmed Roe in Casey, the decision
reflects the continued uneasiness that certain members of the Court feel
about the Roe decision. In turn, that discomfort will shape the direction of
any ruling on the constitutionality of anti-cloning legislation.
b. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
In 1992, in a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmedRoe's
"recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State." 7 The
majority justified its decision on two grounds: the dictates of substantive
due process and respect for the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court's
opinion, authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, noted that
the Constitution protects the decision to have an abortion as a fundamental
right affecting personal privacy.
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education. Our cases recognize "the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.". . .These matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.408
This resounding endorsement of the principles of substantive due
process, however, did not translate into a similarly resounding endorsement
of the decision in Roe. While a majority of the Court reaffirmed Roe's
essential holding, the authors of the majority opinion-Justices O'Connor,
407 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). For a general
discussion of abortion law and an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in
Casey, see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 235, § 14.29, at 809-47.
408 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (citations omitted).
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Kennedy, and Souter-appeared to do so more out of respect for stare
decisis than out of the conviction that substantive due process commanded
the result in Roe.
On the other side of the equation is the interest of the State in the
protection of potential life. The Roe Court recognized the State's
"important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human
life." The weight to be given this state interest, not the strength of the
woman's interest, was the difficult question faced in Roe. We do not need
to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the Court when the
valuation of the state interest came before it as an original matter, would
have concluded, as the Roe Court did, that its weight is insufficient to
justify a ban on abortions prior to viability even when it is subject to
certain exceptions. The matter is not before us in the first instance, and
coming as it does after nearly 20 years of litigation in Roe's wake we are
satisfied that the immediate question is not the soundness of Roe's
resolution of the issue, but the precedential force that must be accorded
to its holding.40
What is significant, for purposes of evaluating the constitutionality of
anti-cloning legislation, is the uncertainty that Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter expressed about the soundness of the Roe Court's
balancing of the state's interest against the liberty interest of the woman.
They intimated that had they been members of the Roe Court, they may
have struck this balance in a different manner. Even though they chose not
to revisit that balancing of interests in Roe, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter did criticize the failure of the Court to adequately evaluate the
state's interests in potential human life, as required by Roe.
The woman's liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from the outset the
State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later
point in fetal development the State's interest in life has sufficient force
so that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be
restricted.10
This concern for the state's interests in the potentiality of human life led
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Casey to reject Roe's contro-
versial trimester approach, viewing it "as a rigid prohibition on all
41 Id. at 871 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).41
°Id. at 869.
1998-99]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
previability regulation aimed at the protection of fetal life."'4 I In addition,
the authors of the joint opinion adopted an "undue burden" standard for
evaluating abortionregulations. That standard falls somewhere between the
rational basis and strict scrutiny tests and invalidates abortion restrictions
that erect a substantial obstacle to a woman's exercise of the right to
abortion with respect to a nonviable fetus 1
The dissenters in Casey argued that "Roe was wrongly decided" and
"should be overruled. ' 1 3 In his dissent, Justice Scalia noted that the
decision to allow abortion is best left to the legislative branch.414 The
significance of the dissenting opinions for any constitutional evaluation of
anti-cloning legislation lies in the dissenters' distinctions between abortion
and other fundamental rights. Chief Justice Rehnquist views the decision
to abort as "'different in kind' "415 from other privacy rights, such as those
involving procreation and contraception, because it "necessarily involves
the destruction of a fetus."' 6 Justice Scalia stated the distinction even more
forcefully: "[T]he best the Court can do to explain how it is that the word
'liberty' must be thought to include the right to destroy human fetuses is to
rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply decorate a value judgment
and conceal a political choice."' 7 The significance of the dissenting
opinions in Casey lies not so much in the critique of substantive due
process, but rather in the dissenters' views on abortion. The Casey
dissenters argue that even accepting the legitimacy of substantive due
process review, the decision to abort a human fetus should not be protected
as a fundamental right.
411 Id. at 873.
412 See id. at 877. The dissent resoundingly criticized the authors of the joint
opinion for adopting the "undue burden" standard. However, some commentators
view Casey's undue burden standard as "the logical outcome of the Court's
gradual, but meaningful, shift concerning a woman's right to an abortion between
the early 1970s and the early 1990s." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 235, §
14.29, at 822.
413 Casey, 505 U.S. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
114 See id. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
415 Id. at952 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting inpart) (citation
omitted).
416 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
417 Id. at 983 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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3. Cloning and Fundamental Rights Analysis
The CPA, the Bond/Lot Act, and the Feinstein/Kennedy Act do not
completely bar the use of cloning for "reproductive" purposes because all
three allow embryo splitting.4 18 Yet, even if they did bar such activity, it is
unlikely that the current Court would find such federal legislation
unconstitutional. First, at least three members of the Court have written or
joined in decisions that suggest the Court should exercise caution in
recognizing new fundamental rights.419 Second, a majority of the Justices
either have said that Roe was wrongly decided or have implied that they
would have ruled differently had they been members of the Roe Court.420
In order to strike down federal cloning legislation as unconstitutional, the
Court would have to recognize the decision to clone as a fundamental right
and conclude that the government's countervailing interest in banning
cloning technology is not compelling. Given the predilections of the
Justices on the current Court, neither is likely to happen.
a. Cloning as a Fundamental Right
In Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court needs to
proceed with caution when considering the creation of new fundamental
rights. According to Rehnquist, the absence of clear "'guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking"' 42 1 justified a more limited judicial approach
to substantive due process review. Rehnquist explained that a "'careful
description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest"4z2 was necessary;
otherwise, the Court might use the amorphous standards of substantive due
process to replace legislative policy judgments with its own.
41 The major distinction among the bills is the ban on cloning research. Both
the CPA and the Feinstein/Kennedy Act only prohibit the actual creation of a
human clone using nuclear transfer technology. See supra notes 226-34 and
accompanying text. By comparison, the Bond/Lott Act bans both the creation of
human clones, as well as cloning research, using nuclear transplantation. See supra
Part II.B.2. This difference, however, is not significant for purposes of a Fifth
Amendment Due Process analysis. The Bond/Lott Act may implicate the First
Amendment by creating an overinclusive ban on scientific research. This Article
does not address that issue.419 See supra notes 361-71 and accompanying text.
420 See supra Part IV.A.2.b.
421 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,2268 (1977) (citation omitted).
422Id.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's formulation of the fundamental rights
analysis garnered the votes of four other Justices on the Court. As a result,
a five-person majority'13 of the current Court agrees with Rehnquist that a
required element of substantive dueprocess review is a careful articulation
of the interest at stake.
Of course, a careful articulation of the interest is not necessarily bad;
however, in practice, a "narrow" framing of the asserted interest allows the
Court to avoid substantive due process review. If a right is not deemed to
be fundamental, the Court must only find that the state interest is legiti-
mate, not compelling.424 Thus, a careful description of asserted rights
results in a narrow list of fundamental interests. For example, in Bowers,
the five-person majority, which included then Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor, framed the interest as the right of homosexuals to engage in
consensual sodomy.4' In Cruzan, the Court assumed, for purposes of its
decision, that a mentally competent person had a fundamental right to
refuse food and water.426 However, the Court's assumption that such a
fundamental right existed was grounded, not in more general notions of
personal autonomy, but rather in the more narrow and traditional concerns
about excessive government interference with bodily integrity.427 Finally,
in Glucksberg, the Court described the interest as the right to assisted
suicide, rather than the right to die with dignity, as suggested by Justice
Breyer, who concurred in the Court's judgment.42 In both Bowers and
Glucksberg, the narrower formulation meant that the Court did not
recognize the asserted interest as fundamental.
This is more than mere semantics. Because the fundamental rights
analysis examines whether an asserted right is deeply grounded in national
tradition, a narrow formulation of that right makes it more difficult to
satisfy the traditional fundamental rights test. In fact, some of the rights
" Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion. See id. at 2260-61.424 See NOWAK &ROTUNDA, supra note 235, § 14.3, at 600-02, 606.
42See supra notes 344-52 and accompanying text
426 See supra note 361.
427 The Court made this distinction about the decision in Cruzan in its
Glucksberg decision. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2269-70. Chief Justice
Rehnquist authored both decisions, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy. See id. at 2260-61; Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261,264 (1990). Justice Thomas, who was not a member of the Court at the time
of the Cruzan decision, joined the Court's opinion in Glucksberg. Justice White
was the fifth member of the Cruzan majority. See id. at 264.41 See supra notes 377-80 and accompanying text.
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now recognized as fundamental, if narrowly drawn, certainly would not
have survived the historical test. Contraception was not a common practice
in the early days of this country's founding, and sex outside of marriage
certainly is not a right deeply grounded in national tradition. Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court has held that government intrusion into the decision to
use contraceptives violates the fundamental rights of both married 29 and
single 3 ° persons. The distinction lies in the manner in which the Court
framed the issue in the contraceptive cases. Rather than ask whether a
single woman has the right to use contraceptives, the Court held that the
right of privacy includes the right "to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child."431
So how might the Court describe the asserted interest in a challenge to
cloning legislation? There are two obvious possibilities. Embryo splitting
and nuclear transplantation involving embryonic cells could be compared
to in vitro fertilization, which is a treatment for infertility. Thus, the Court
could frame the asserted interest as the decision whether to bear or beget
children ortheright to procreation. Alternatively, the Court couldnarrowly
describe the interest as the right to engage in cloning. The latter formula-
tion (or some variant thereof) is more likely, given the Court's recent
pronouncements on substantive due process. Such a narrow articulation of
the interest means that the Court will determine that the right to clone is not
fundamental. First, there is no deeply rooted national tradition recognizing
cloning because it is a radical new technology. Second, denying fundamen-
tal rights to cloning will not sacrifice liberty or justice and, thus, will not
violate the concept of ordered liberty.
Even in the unlikely event that the Supreme Court were to recognize
a fundamental right to have access to some or all cloning technology, the
Court, at a minimum, would sustain the CPA and the Feinstein/Kennedy
Act as constitutional. Once the Court recognizes a right as fundamental,
legislation "limiting [that] right may be justified only by a 'compelling
state interest,"' that is "'narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake."", 32 The CPA and the Feinstein/Kennedy Act would
easily satisfy the strict scrutiny test. First, the NBAC has recognized that
there are serious questions about the safety of cloning.
429 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43o See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
431 Id. at 453 (citations omitted).
432Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citations omitted).
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At present, the use of [somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning] to create a
child would be a premature experiment that exposes the developing child
to unacceptable risks. This in itself is sufficient to justify a prohibition on
cloning human beings at this time, even if such efforts were to. be
characterized as the exercise of a fundamental right to attempt to
procreate. 33
Second, the prohibitions in the CPA andthe Feinstein/Kennedy Act, though
not necessarily those in the Bond/Lott Act, 34 are narrowly drawn to address
the government interest in safety. Both Acts only prohibit the actual
implantation of a clone in order to create a newborn human. Neither
penalizes cloning research, and both expire after a certain time period.
Thus, neither act imposes a permanent ban on the technology.435
b. The Impact of the Abortion Decisions
The abortion controversy will no doubt play a major role in the Court's
analysis of federal cloning legislation. All forms of cloning involve
experimentation on embryos. Embryo splitting entails the separation of
early embryonic cells in order to create multiple copies of the original
embryo.436 Nuclear transfer, whether of the nucleus of adult or embryonic
cells, will result in the creation of a human embryo, many of which will not
survive or even be implanted. If Dr. Wilmut's experiment is any indication,
hundreds of thousands of embryos will be created and destroyed in the
process of perfecting human cloning techniques. It took Dr. Wilmut 277
tries before he successfully created the clone known as "Dolly.' 437 And, in
the year since Dolly's announcement, no other scientist has been able to
repeat Dr. Wilmut's success. 438
433 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 108.
434 If the Court applied a fundamental rights analysis to cloning, the Bond/Lott
Act might be found unconstitutional because it reaches too far. The Act bans both
the creation of human clones, as well as human cloning research. There are clear
safety risks in creating a human clone at this time. It is less clear that there are
safety risks involved in human cloning research. Research implicates moral and
ethical questions about the status of the embryo. Therefore, a claim asserting the
right to engage in cloning research based on the First Amendment may succeed if
the Court recognizes a protected interest in the right to engage in scientific inquiry.
435 See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.436 See supra Part I.A. 1.c.
437 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.43 See Nicholas Wade, With No Other 'Dollys, 'CloningReport Draws Critics,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1998, atA8.
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Destruction of human embryos implicates issues similar to those in the
abortion decisions. Three of the Court's current members-Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas-h'believe that Roe was wrongly
decided" and "should be overruled." 439 They conclude that the right to an
abortion differs from personal decisions involving "marriage, procreation,
and contraception [because] abortion 'involves the purposeful termination
of a potential life.' "0 For these three Justices, abortion is not a fundamen-
tal right.
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, in their joint opinion in
Casey, reaffirmed Roe's basic holding regarding a woman's right to have
an abortion prior to fetal viability." Thus, they recognized the right to
abortion as a fundamental right. At the same time, however, they intimated
that had they been on the Roe Court, they may have given more weight to
"the interest of the State in the protection of potential life." 2 Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter noted that the "difficult question faced in
Roe" 3 was the balancing of the state's and the woman's interest. The
state's interest is "its concern for the life of the unborn."" The woman's
interest is twofold: (1) protection of "the liberty relating to intimate
relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or not to beget or
bear a child ' " 5 and (2) "protection of personal autonomy and bodily
integrity."" 6
Cloning, unlike abortion, does not implicate this second interest in
bodily integrity. Cloning occurs outside the body. A woman need never
agree to reimplantation of a cloned embryo. Thus, cloning legislation,
unlike a restrictive abortion statute, does not compel a woman to carry a
fetus to term. This is an important distinction because it eliminates one
justification for recognizing a fundamental right to abortion. In Casey,
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter implied that the state's interest in
potential life would have sufficed to "justify a ban on abortions prior to
viability"" 7 had they decided the Roe case. Why, then, would they find
unconstitutional legislation that advances the government's interest in
49 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Id. at 952 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980)).
441 See id. at 846.
442 Id. at 871.
443 Id.
44Id. at 869.
" Id. at 857 (citations omitted).
4"Id.
447Id. at 871.
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potential human life in a case in which there is no affirmative government
interference with bodily integrity?
Thus, it appears that six of the current Justices will not extend the
Court's fundamental liberty protection to the decision to use cloning as a
form of "reproduction." The reasons articulated by individual Justices for
doing so will vary.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas may ground
their decision either on their opposition to expanding substantive due
process review, their disagreement with the Roe decision, or some
combination of these two lines of reasoning. Chief Justice Rehnquist has
long opposed an expansion of substantive due process review. He joined
Justice White's majority decision in Bowers, which narrowly defined the
asserted liberty interest as the right to engage in homosexual sodomy." 8 In
Thornburgh, hejoined Justice White's dissent, which argued that although
the right to an abortion "is a species of 'liberty' ... this liberty is [not] so
'fundamental' that restrictions upon it call into play anything more than the
most minimal judicial scrutiny." 9 In his concurring opinion in Cruzan,
Justice Scalia forcefully argued that "federal courts [had] no business45 0
making constitutional decisions about matters that properly belong before
state legislatures. He likened the controversy over the "right to die" to that
over the right to abortion and expressed concern lest the Court travel down
the same disastrous path opened up by its decision in Roe. Finally, in
Casey, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas called for
Roe to be overruled.4 1 The three Justices criticized Roe as an undue
expansion of fundamental rights analysis,"2 which strongly suggests that
they would not extend to cloning the protection of fundamental rights
status.
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter also are unlikely to extend
fundamental rights protection to cloning, but they will decline to do so for
different reasons. In their joint opinion in Casey, the three Justices defined
liberty in the sweeping terms of the "right to define one's own concept of
48 See supra notes 344-52 and accompanying text.
"
9Thornburghv. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747,790 (1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruledby Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
450 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,293 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
451 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
452 See id. at 951-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 982-84 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."4 3
This language suggests that the authors ofthejoint opinion might recognize
access to cloning as subsumed within the concept of liberty. After all,
cloning raises questions about individuality, the role of the person, and the
mystery of life. Despite the grand language in Casey, however, Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy joined in Chief Justice Rehnquist's Glucksberg
opinion, which expressed concern over unduly expanding substantive due
process review.' Justice Souter concurred in the judgment in Glucksberg,
but wrote separately in order to articulate a vision of substantive due
process different from that expressed by the majority.4 5
This uncertainty regarding what Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter consider as the proper scope of substantive review, however, does
not preclude intelligent predictions about how they might rule in a due
process challenge to cloning legislation. All three Justices indicate some
uneasiness about Roe's balancing of the state's interest in protecting the
unborn. This interest also exists with cloning, albeit at an earlier stage of
development. With respect to cloning, the woman does not have a
countervailing interest in bodily integrity. In addition, the government has
an interest in ensuring the safety ofthe procedure for children born through
cloning. Thus, it is likely that the authors of the joint opinion will find that
the state's interest in protecting the potential life of the unborn, as well as
ensuring the safety of cloned children, outweighs any interest that an
individual may have to reproduce ising cloning technology.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal efforts to ban cloning will survive scrutiny under both the
Commerce Clause4 56 and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.45 7
First, Lopez does not appear to be a radical departure from prior Commerce
Clause case law. Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggests caution in
discarding decades of Supreme Court precedent to return to an antiquated
notion of economic relations.4 8 Second, even as it stands, Lopez is
distinguishable from current federal efforts to ban cloning. The proscribed
453 Id. at 851.
4I See supra notes 372-76 and accompanying text.
41 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
456 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.417 Id. amend. V.
458 See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
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activity in Lopez, though criminal in nature, involved intrastate, noncom-
mercial behavior.459 Cloning, on the other hand, involves interstate
commerce, possibly interstate travel, and commercial activity. Therefore,
even thoughLopezmay give pause to constitutional scholars in terms of the
future of Commerce Clause litigation, it seems to provide no major
impediment to current efforts by Congress to ban cloning.
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause also poses no impediment
to federal anti-cloning legislation. First, it is unlikely that the Court will
hold that cloning constitutes a fundamental right. Even if the Court does so
hold, the government interests involved in banning cloning are compelling.
Cloning is not safe. In addition, the government has an important interest
in potential human life, and, unlike abortion, there is no countervailing
interference with a woman's liberty interest in controlling her body.
Therefore, the current anti-cloning bills, if enacted into law, will survive
scrutiny under the Commerce Clause and the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.
'9 See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
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